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On June, 9, 2000, the 'Independent on Saturday' reported that, ' . . .more than 180 Durban clothing
factory owners may face contempt of court jail sentences over their refusal to register workers and
abide by South Africa's labour laws' (Independent on Saturday, June 09 2000). The majority of these
employers were said to be members of the Confederation of Employers of South Africa (COFESA).
Why, one might ask, would employers affiliate themselves to COFESA at the risk of imprisonment?
The answer lies in the fact that the Durban clothing-manufacturing sector has traditionally produced
low end of the range clothing for the poor inland population. This was a profitable activity in the
formally protected trade environment, but exposure to international competition (through trade
liberalisation) has undermined this profitability. In order to retain some price competitiveness many
Durban clothing manufacturers are circumventing minimum wage requirements (and other labour
legislation) through membership of the infamous COFESA, ' ... a cross-sectoral federation providing
legal advice on industrial relations issues with a special reference to employer protection under the
new labour legislation. It is understood that the federation encourages companies to retrench or fire all
staff and re-employ them as contract labour' (House and Williams: 2000: 9).
It is primarily small subcontracted clothing manufacturers that 'Cut, Make and Trim' (CMT) garments
for wholesalers, retailers or full manufacturers that adhere to the COFESA system. As was discovered
(through personal interviews with firm owners) the closure of these CMT firms is imminent and the
COFESA system is a temporary fix for greater firm level competitiveness problems.
1.1 Research Questions
With the dire situation of CMT firms in mind the central question of this dissertation is: what are the
upgrading trajectories of, and opportunities available to small Durban CMT manufacturers using the
COFESA labour contracting system? Subsidiary questions that flow from this principal research
question include:
I) What is the upgrading trajectory of CMT firms using this flexible labour arrangement,
2) What hinders upgrading in these firms,
3) And what are the upgrading opportunities available to these firms?
To answer these research questions I probe two strains of theoretical discourse: value chain upgrading
and labour market flexibility. Thereafter a theory is developed to model value chain upgrading in the
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context of labour market flexibility. What follows is a precis of the theoretical underpinnings of this
dissertation.
1.2 Theoretical Precis
Whilst globalisation is a useful term for describing the integration of global production, the concept of
'value chains' is a more thorough method of analysing this phenomenon by linking value-adding
production activities on a global scale. High value adding activities in these chains tend to be located
in the industrialised 'centre' where demand is high (e.g. Japan, Western Europe and North America)
whilst lower value adding activities are generally dispersed amongst the 'peripheral' developing
countries.
Governance relationships are fundamental determinants of the nature of these value chains. Two types
predominate. Producer driven value chains are common in capital-intensive industries (such as in the
automotive industry) and are characterised by highly integrated chains. Buyer Driven value chains, on
the other hand, are often highly fragmented. Clothing production chains form one of the most distinct
examples in which ' .. .large retailers, branded manufacturers and trading companies play the pivotal
role in setting up decentralised production networks in a variety of exporting companies, typically in
the third world' (Campbell and Parisotto: 1995: 7).
In recent times clothing consumers have begun to demand more from retailers in terms of price ,
quality, design and variety. In the manufacturing sector these demands translate into the need for low
labour costs, greater flexibility and decreased delivery time. Whilst retailers once had some
involvement in the manufacturing sector the trend is for retailers to hand activities that require the
most flexibility over to manufacturing subcontractors. Subcontractors in turn outsource to smaller
CMT operations. These firms are often forced to adapt their labour practices to maximise flexibility
and reduce labour costs. The result has been a global increase in flexible terms of employment
amongst clothing workers and an overemphasis on price competitiveness within CMT firms. Many of
these firms cannot withstand the impact of global competition and are engaging in a 'race to the
bottom' of the value chain.
For small CMT operations traditional value chain upgrading models offer limited insight into their
predicament. The hypothesis underpinning Humphrey and Schmitz' (2000) upgrading model is that as
firms link into international value chains (especially through exporting) they can initiate an upgrading
path. This path begins with process upgrading (increasing the efficiency of internal processes) and is
followed by product upgrading, functional upgrading (changing or increasing the value adding
activities that one is involved in) and ultimately chain upgrading (moving to a completely new value
chain). International experience shows that while foreign buyers are willing to help local producers
raise quality and efficiency they are unwilling to support more ambitious local strategies to improve
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design and marketing. CMT firms at the bottom of the value chain are particularly constricted as their
customers (usually wholesalers or full manufacturers) jealously guard access to final markets.
Clustering theory offers some respite for CMT firms. In terms of this theory upgrading is possible if
firms engage in conscious joint action, either through collaborating with their competitors or through
encouraging vertical integration by implementing flexible specialisation techniques. Intense labour
market flexibility would however tend to undermine some of the benefits of clustering if disgruntled
staff work against the upgrading process
1.3 Methodology
Since it has been ascertained that CMT firms have limited upgrading opportunities a model is
developed for 'upgrading in the context of labour market flexibility' in Chapter Two of this
dissertation. Chapter Three outlines the emergence of the Durban based CMT firms from which point
the upgrading trajectory of 10 present day CMT firms (interviewed in August and September of 2001)
is discussed in Chapter Four. Drawing on the theoretical discourse in Chapter Two and discussion in
Chapter Four, the research questions are answered in Chapter Five.
Information for this dissertation was gathered through three principal sources. An extensive literature
review was conducted to inform the theoretical and historical background chapters whilst discussion in
Chapter Four was derived from interviews conducted with 10 CMT firm owners. Six key informants
(mostly representatives from clothing related institutions) with intricate knowledge of the Durban
CMT sector were also interviewed to supplement interview and theoretical datal. Since CMT firms do
not tend to keep extensive business records (as was discovered through key informant interviews) the
decision was made to develop a semi-structured qualitative questionnaire to guide firm owner
interviews. Interview questions were derived from themes explored in Chapter Two and from key
informant data (see Appendix I for copy of firm questionnaire) . Where quantitative information was
required, owners were asked to recalled general performance trends in various criteria (for example
profit, turnover and productivity).
1 Interviews were conducted with representatives of The Clothing Federation of South Africa (CLOFED), the
Natal Clothing Manufacturing Association (NCMA), the Southern African Clothing and Textile Workers Union
(SACTWU), COFESA, the Durban Manufacturing Advisory Centre (DUMAC) and the Bargaining Council for
the Clothing Industry, Natal (BCCI, Natal).
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2 Theory: CMT value chain upgrading in the context of labour
market flexibility
2.1 Value Chains
During the 17th century colonial powers began their conquest of the world in search of raw materials
and new markets for exports. In so doing they initiated a process of 'internationalisation' whereby
economic activities spread across national boundaries (Ramaswamy: 2000: 192). During the era of
internationalisation trade between countries usually occurred in the form of finished manufactured
goods from the colonial powers and raw materials from colonised countries. This changed slightly in
the 1950s and 1960s when American and European multinational corporations (MNCs) began locating
entire production facilities offshore. It was only in the 1970s that the picture of international trade and
production changed drastically as some multinational enterprises began to locate labour intensive
manufacturing activities in developing countries in isolation from the production of finished goods
(McCormick and Schmitz: 2001: 15). New transport and communication technologies fuelled the
subdivision of manufacturing processes in the 1980's and 1990's, 'so that even a single product could
be made in multiple locations' (Harrison: 1996). Production had in effect been globalised whereby
internationally dispersed production activities are functionally integrated. The march of globalisation
(characterised specifically by inter-country trade in manufactured components of the whole product) is
empirically verified in the following graph (Figure 1) which shows the dramatic and sustained increase
in exports of manufactured goods since 1980 as opposed to the less impressive increase in production
ofmanufactured goods.
4

















Source: Derived from www.wto.orglenglish/res_e/statis_e/its2002_e/section2_e/iiOl .xls
Value chains are an effective means of conceptualising the integration of global production (Gereffi et
al: 2001: 1). Michael Porter laid the conceptual foundations of value chain theory in the 1980s with
his 'value system' theory. This original theory was somewhat lacking in that interlinked firms were
seen as complete units containing all business functions. Also power relations and governance within
the chain and their impact on the chain were not explored (Gereffi et al: 2001: 3). Drawing on
dependency theory, Gary Gereffi (1994) dealt with these deficiencies by developing the concept of
'G lobal Commodity Chains' (GCCs) in which he gave special attention to governance and barriers to
entry in the chain.
Value chains build on the concept of global commodity chains, but have the advantage of focusing on
value added at each link in the chain (Gibbon: 2000b and Kaplinsky: 1998 cited in Humphrey and
Schmitz: 2000f In their 'Handbook for Value Chain Research ' , Kaplinsky and Morris (2001) define
the value chain as the description of, ' ...the full range of activities which are required to bring a
product from conception, through the different phases of production..., delivery to consumers, and
final disposal after use' (Kaplinsky and Morris: 2001: 4). In its basic form the value chain consists of
four sequential value adding activities namely: design, production , marketing and lastly, consumption
2 GCCs are also a slightl y limiting concept because ' commodity' usuall y refers to undifferentiated, cheap
product or raw material
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and recycling. The basic clothing value chain begins with the development, design and manufacture
of textiles, next comes garment design and production which is followed by marketing, distribution
and sale to the consumer (McCormick and Schmitz: 2001). In reality value chains are far more
complex with each activity in the chain impacting on (and being impacted) by activities up and down
the chain.
2.1.1 The Clothing Value Chain: Governance and barriers to entry
As mentioned, Gary Gereffi gave special attention to governance and barriers to entry in his GCC
theory . These two factors help transform value chain analysis from a purely heuristic (descriptive)
devise into an analytical tool (Kaplinsky and Morris: 200 I: 25). With this in mind it is possible to use
these aspects ofvalue chains to analyse the global clothing industry.
2.1.1.1 Governance
The complexity of production in the globalised era requires ' sophisticated forms of co-ordination.'
Governance helps us understand these forms of co-ordination by incorporating a firms positioning in
the value chain, logistics, ' ...the integration of components into the design of the final products and the
quality standards with which this integration is achieved' (Kaplinsky and Morris: 2001: 29).
Kaplinsky (2000) identifies three forms of governance based on an interpretation of civic law. These
include legislative governance (setting of rules) , judicial governance (auditing of performance) and
executive governance (assistance to meet requirements) . They can occur at different points along the
chain and can occur within the chain or outside the chain. Building on the Kaplinsky's (2000)
understanding of governance (but with greater reference to the business strategies that form
governance relationships) Humphrey and Schmitz (2000) say that governance is ' ...any co-ordination
of economic activities through non-market relations' (Humphrey and Schmitz: 2000: 3). They divide
non-market governance relations into network, quasi-hierarchical and hierarchical (Table 1). While
different forms of governance can exist in one chain, governance relationships in the apparel industry
tend to be quasi-hierarchical.
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Network Co-operationbetween more or less 'equals'. Suppliers and buyers jointly define the
product, and combine complementary competences. This is more common when buyer and
supplier are innovators, close to the technology or market frontiers. The risk of the buyer is
minimised by the supplier's high level of competence.
Quasi-Hierarchy High degree of control of buyer over supplier; buyer defines the product. The buyer would
incur losses from the suppliers' performance failures, and there are some doubts about the
competence of the supplier. Where high supplier competence is not generalised, buyers
invest in specific suppliers and seek to tie them to the chain.
Hierarchy Buyer takes direct ownership of developing country operations. The buyer carries out
product definition, which may involve proprietary technology. The risks of poor
performance by independent suppliers increase ifthc buyer uses quality as a brand attribute.
These factors favour direct control over the production process.
Source: Humphrey and Schmitz: 2000: 6
Whi le Kaplinsky and Morris (200 I) warn that one should not confuse governance with the role of lead
firms in a value chain, lead firms play significant governing roles. In the apparel value chain for
instance retailer and brand name companies are major determiners of the structure of value chains as
well as their co-ordination (Humphrey and Schmitz: 2000: 4)). Lead firm governance roles ' ...stems
from two attributes: their market power. ..and their positioning in chain segments in which they can
create and/or appropriate high returns' (Gereffi et al : 2001: 4) With the governing role of lead firms in
mind, Gary Gereffi (1999b) makes a distinction between two types of value chains namely: producer
driven and buyer driven value chains.
Pro ducer driven chains are common in capital-intensive industries such as the automotive industry and
tend to be characterised by network or hierarchical integration. In these chains the producer is
primarily responsible for co-ordination in the chain. In this dissertation I am concerned with Buyer
Driven Commodity Chains (BDCC) found in labour intensive sectors such as clothing and footwear.
Co-ordination responsibility within these chains generally lies with retailers, branded merchandisers
and branded manufacturers (often located in wealthy northern states) who form quasi-hierarchical
governance relationships with independently owned 'manufacturers/suppliers' (often located in low
wage southern nation states).
2.1.1.2 Barriers to Entry
The governance role of retailers, branded merchandisers and branded manufacturers in the clothing
value chain is consolidated through rents (or profits) and barriers to entry. In clothing value chains
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rent is generated through organisational, branding and marketing capabilities and a protected market.
These place certain barriers to entry into the retai ling sector. Barriers to entry tend to fall as one
moves down the value chain towards the level of the manufacturer because of intense competitive
pressure at this level. They are depleted even further at the level of sub-contract CMT manufacturers.
(Gereffi: 1999a; Kaplinsky and Morris: 2001)
As discussed, the three types of buyers in the global apparel chain that generate the largest rents and
possess some if not all of the barriers to entry listed above are retailers, branded manufacturers and
branded merchandisers located predominantly in the European Union (EU) and the United States of
America (US). US buyers are listed in the Table 2.
Table 2: US clothing buyer and their buying characteristics
Type of Importers Representative Firms Characteristics of Orders
Low-priced store brand products.
Discounters/outlet stores (retailers) Wal-Mart. Kmart, Target Huge orders.
Good quality , medium-priced goods
sold under private labels. Large
Mass merchandisers (retailers) 1.C. Penney, Sears, Woolworth orders.
The Gap, The Limited,
Department stores/speciality stores Bloomingdale's , May Department [I'op quality , high-priced goods sold
retailers) Stores under private labels . Large orders.
Liz Clairborne, Calvin Kline,
Brand-name marketers Tommy Hilfiger Same as department stores
VF Corporation, Sara Lee, Levi National brands. Medium to large
Brand-name apparel manufacturers Strauss &Co orders.
Source: Ramaswamy and Gereffi: 2000: 194
'As apparel production has become globally dispersed and competition between [the major buyers]
intensified, each has developed extensive global sourcing capabi lities . While de-verticalising
production, they are fortifying their activities in the high value-added design and marketing segments
of the apparel chain' (Gereffi: 1999b: 5). The dramatic rise of apparel imports into the US economy
(Figure 2) illustrates the withdrawal of US and EU buyers from the manufacturing component of
apparel product ion. While US clothing buyers used to the main customers of domestic US clothing
manufacturers they have fast become their biggest competitors.
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Source: Derived from Gereffi: 1999a: 50
International sourcing patterns of lead clothing firms are generally differentiated along the lines of
upper-market, middle-market and mass (lower) market clothing. As the proceeding diagram indicates
(Figure 3) first and second tier countries produce upper market garments . Middle-market or basic
items tend to be produced by second, third or fourth tier producers (second tier producers are
sometimes referred to as ' full package' suppl iers who control many productive and co-ordination
functions in the chain). The production of mass-market clothing is outsourced to third, forth and fifth
tier countries.
Figure 3: Production frontiers for global sourcing by US retailers: the apparel industry
Tiers Supplier Countries within Tiers
First Tier Italy, France, UK, Japan
Second Tier Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea
Third Tier India, Turkey, Egypt, Brazil , Mexico , Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, China
Fourth Tier Central America, Caribbean, Colombia, Chile, Eastern Europe, Kenya, Zimbabwe,
Mauritius , Macao, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, China, Tunisia, Morocco , DAE, Oman
Fifth Tier Qatar, Peru, Bolivia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Russia , Lesotho, Madagascar, North
Korea, Myanmar , Cambodia, Laos, Maldives, Fiji, Cyprus, Bahrain
Source: Gereffi: 1994: 221
While there are clear similarities between the sourcing patterns and market strategies of US and EU
clothing buyers, Gibbon (2000a) notes that firms in these two market regions belong to very different
value chains . The EU market is more fashion orientated and diversified and so garments are often
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sourced from nearby European countries. In the US mid-market items still hold some prestige and as a
result US sourcing patterns tend to be globalised. US buyers are exacting in terms of their
requirements and will often plant a foreign branch where orders from foreign suppliers exceed five
million US dollars. EU buyers rely heavily on the capability of their suppliers. They require them to
provide more inputs and services and will make yearly or bi-yearly visits to supplier plants (Gibbon:
2000a).
2.1.2 Value Chain Analysis as a Development Issue
In the clothing industry the ability of large buyers to source products from a wide variety of producers,
in a number of countries, has increased the pressure on manufacturers to produce better quality
garments at lower prices. In many cases firms or whole economies find themselves trapped in a cycle
of 'immiserising growth' whereby competitive pressures push profit and wages below levels that
sustain firms and individual workers (Kaplinsky and Morris: 2001) . So while developing countries
might be acquiring a greater share of global production the terms by which they trade are declining'
(Kaplinsky: 2000).
The emerging theoretical discourse concerning value chains is useful in that it allows us to research
production networks in their entirety. The impact of strategic practices at the top of the chain can be
related to socio-economic outcomes at the lowest links of the chain. From the preceding discoveries
local, national and international policies can be developed that promote positive outcomes from
insertion into the chain. These positive outcomes include: even income distribution and the
unimpeded flow of knowledge down the chain. Value chain analysis can also encourage upgrading in
individual firms as entrepreneurs shift attention from price competitiveness (which often leads to
immiserising growth) to focus on quality, market position, quick response and the establishment of
effective supply and distribution networks.
Given the number of CMT firms operating in Durban and the focus of this dissertation it is critical to
consider upgrading opportunities available to CMT clothing manufacturers.
2.1.3 Upgrading in the Clothing Value Chain
Gary Gereffi published much of the seminal work on upgrading in the apparel value chain in the mid
)
. to late 1990's. Tam and Gereffi (1999) define upgrading as ' ...a process of improving the ability ofa
firm or an economy to move to higher value added , more profitable, and/or technologically more
sophisticated economic niches (Tam and Gereffi: 1999: 12). Humphrey and Schmitz (2000) express
some confusion about the concept saying that, ' ... while authors stress the importance of upgrading, it
3 ' ... [Over] the past two decades Brazilian shoe producers have commanded more than 12% of global leather shoe exports.
At the same time, between 1970 and 1980 average real wages in the sector were stagnant, and during the following decade
they fell by approximately 40% in real terms' (Schmitz: 1995 cited in Kaplinsky: 2000: 120)
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remains an elusive concept that has been difficult to pin down. There are various possible taxonomies,
and the range of upgrading possibilities across different sectors and differently structured value chains
appears to be huge' (Humphrey and Schmitz: 2000: 11, 12).
Gereffi's (1994) hypothesis is that if clothing producers, ' ...gain access to the chain [they] have good
prospects for upgrading within production and then subsequently [moving] into design, marketing and
branding as a consequence of a combination of ' learning by exporting' and ' organisational
succession" (Humphrey and Schmitz: 2000 : 13». Entry into chains is seen as a necessary factor for
upgrading and is determined by state policy, social and organisational factors (Tarn and Gereffi: 1999:
8). Once producers gain access to the chain they become more knowledgeable (in terms of the nature
of buying intermediaries and end markets, quality requirements, lead times, sourcing linkages and
supply co-ordination) and can engage in ' organisational succession' meaning that they begin engaging
in high value adding activities such as design and marketing (Gibbon: 2000b).
The rationale for Gereffi's (1994) hypothesis comes from the frequently cited experience of the East
Asian newly industrialised countries or NICs (namely: Hong Kong, Singapore, Republic of Korea and
Taiwan), who in the late 1960s and early 1970s began garment assembly work for the European and
North American markets. As some assemblers became more competent they established their position
as 'first tier suppliers' by extended their range of manufacturing activities, developing backward
linkages with textile firms and outsourcing less skilled manufacturing work to low wage , peripheral, or
second tier, Asian countries (such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand). Essentially, NIC producers
had upgraded from being assemblers to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs/. Their success lay
in their ability to flexibly manage overseas production systems (Gereffi : 1999a). 'Subsequently, Japan
and some firms in the East Asian NICs pushed beyond the OEM export role to original brand name
manufacturing (OBM) by joining their production expertise with the design and sale of their own
branded merchandise in domestic and overseas markets" (Gereffi: 1999a: 38). Despite rapid wage
increases the NICs remained one of the biggest exporters of garments to the US in 1996. Some second
tier supplier have also begun to upgrade to the position of OEM by outsourcing production to
countries such as Cambodia, Laos, Nepal and Vietnam (Harrison: 1996).
Based on his hypothesis derived from the experience of the NICs, Gereffi developed two models for
industrial upgrading. Humphrey and Schmitz (2000) criticise his models for being non-implementable
at the firm level. They propose an updated (but similar) model, which Kaplinsky and Morris (2001)
build on in their 'Value Chain Manual.' The model consists of four sequential upgrading stages
4 The four most prominent Hong Kong based firms that have made the transition to OEM are Fang Brothers
Knitting, the Esquel Group, Winsor Industrial Corporation and Novel Enterprises.
5 About 10 Hong Kong based clothing firms (including Novel and Fang Bothers) have made the transition to
OBM.
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namely: process, product, functional and chain upgrading (Table 3). Through these stages firms move
from assembly, to OEM, to Own Design Manufacture (ODM) and finally to OBM production.
Table 3: Stages of value cha in upgrading and definitions
Stages of Result of Definition
Upgrading Upgrading
Process Assembly Increasing the efficiency of internal processes such that these are significantly
upgrading OEM better than those of rivals, both within individual links in the chai n (for
example, increased inventory turns, lower scrap) , and between the links in the
chain (for example, more frequent, sma ller and on-time deliveries). Process
upgrading is often referred to as flexible specialization (see section 2.1.4.1)
Product ODM Introducing new products or improving old pro ducts faster than riva ls. This
Upgrading involves changing new product development processes both within individual
links in the value chain and in the relations hip between different chain links
Functional OBM Increasing value added by changing the mix of activities conducted within the
Upgrading firm (for example, taking responsibility for, or outsourcing accounting,
logistics and quality functions) or moving the locus of activities to different
links in the value chain (for example from manufacturing to design)
Chain Moving to a new value chain (for example, Taiwanese firms moved from the
Upgrading manufacture of transistor radios to calculators , to TVs, to computer monitors,
to laptops and now to WAP phones)
Major source: Kaplinsky and Morris: 2001: 38,39
In this model upgrading is seen as strikingly inevitable and uni-linear and is vaguely reminiscent of the
modernist bravado evident in Rostow's (1960) five stages of development. Humphrey and Schmitz
(2000) warn that upgrading processes are influenced heavily by governance relationsh ips, strategic
intent by individual firms to access knowledge, external contingencies (international institutions, trade
policies and agreements as well as the global economy) as well as 'local and national systems' that
enhance learning (Humphrey and Schmitz: 2000: 15). r now turn to a broader discussion of these
influences.
2.1.3.1 Effect of External Contingencies
Putting somewhat of a damper on the upgrading model derived from the experiences of NIC apparel
firms is the fact that upgrading in East Asian countries was in some part shaped by the Multi Fibre
Arrangement (MFA) established in 1974. The MFA was a protectionist response by industrialised
countries to rising exports from developing countr ies. Under the MFA, importers of clothing and
textiles established bi-lateral import quotas in specific categories whenever imports began to threaten
the local industry. The MPA had the unintended result of promot ing globalisation of the clothing
industry as well as upgrading in some firms. As quotas in one country were used up entrepreneurs
would look for other countries to use as production platforms. The unintended result was that their
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firms would evolve from simple assembly plants to OEM plants, co-ordinating international
production processes (Salinger et al: 1999, Gibbon: 2000b, Ramaswamy and Gereffi: 2000). 'Quota
hopping' as it was called caused a type of upgrading which Gibbon (2000b) shows' ... has not being
repeated (at least not in the same form) in the current growth poles of the international apparel
industry - Mexico, Turkey, Eastern Europe and North Africa' (Gibbon: 2000b: 7).
Mauritius' garment industry grew significantly as a result of quota hopping by Hong Kong based
garment manufacturers in the late 1980s. By the mid 1990s some Mauritian owned garment
manufacturers were attempting to move up the value chain beyond OEM to OBM. Yet, by 2000 only
two or three firms still had their own labels or brands. In retrospect, managers said that they had
underestimated the capital, market knowledge and managerial skills that OBM required. While
Mauritian firms had in the past achieved successful backward integration as a result of the EU/Lome
Commission" this experience was not transferable to forward integration and so towards the end of the
1990s firms reverted to the production of long run basics for the middle-income market in the EU and
us. In the process they consolidated their existing market segment (Gibbon: 2000b).
The MFA ended in 1994. Trade in apparel is now governed by the Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing (ATC), signed as part of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1994. The
ATC necessitates the phasing out of bi-lateral import quotas by 2005. In light of this agreement
developed countries have begun signing regional trade agreements with developing countries allowing
textiles produced in industrialised countries to be exported to developing countries, manufactured into
garments, and re-imported at preferential rates. These regional agreements are referred to as Outward
Processing Traffic (OPT) and exist between Germany and Eastern European countries, between
France and the Mediterranean and between the United States and the Caribbean and Mexico. In the
latter case, Bair and Gereffi (2001) show how the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
has attracted many US apparel buyers (especially retailers and marketers) to divert production from
far-flung regions to Torreon in neighbouring Mexico. As a result of the requirements of new buyers
producers in this region have moved away from being simple maquila (assembly) to full-package
(OEM) producers. Regional trade agreements will ultimately limit the opportunities that excluded
parties (especially sub-Saharan countries) have for insertion into value chains and for resultant
upgrading (Salinger et al: 1999).
6 'The European Community's unique relationship with LDC's is enshrined in the Lome Convention, a 'mixed'
treaty (which connotes shared responsibility among the Community and its member states) signed between the
EC and 66 African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) countries which are all former colonies of the West European
powers. A product of the earlier Yauonde Convention, the Lome Convention was first negotiated in 1975 and is
renegotiated every five years. The negotiations for Lome IV were essentially concluded in late 1989 and will be
implemented in 1990. The Lome Agreement thus represents the main pillar of the Community's development
activities and gives the Commission authority and legitimacy in this domain. The Community therefore has
shared competence in the domain of LDC relations , but all aspects concerning trade relations with the Third
World remain the exclusive competence of the Community itself '
(http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/g7/scholarlhainsworthI990/bisnorth.htm).
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2.1.3.2 Effect of National Policies and other National Specificities
Edwards (1993) has shown that rapid export expansion in Korea in the early 1960s was driven to a
large extent by ' ...(a) direct cash subsidies (until 1964); (b) direct tax reductions (until 1973); (c)
interest rate preferences; (d) indirect tax reductions on intermediate inputs; and (e) tariff exemptions
on imported intermediate materials' (Edwards: 1993: 1376). Governments in the NICs also
substantially subsidised education, health and welfare during the era of rapid industrialization reducing
the responsibility of employers in providing these benefits. This improved the price competitiveness
of manufacturers and released funds to be invested into upgrading initiatives (Fryer and Newham:
2000).
Tarn and Gereffi (1999) go so far as to say that upgrading will only occur if governmental investment
is made to encourage design and development capabilities based on knowledge acquired. According
to Bair and Gereffi (2001) upgrading has been limited amongst denim manufacturers in the Torreon
region of Mexico because ofa weak governmental institutional environment.
2.1.3.3 Effect of Strategic Intent
'Upgrading involves changing the basis of knowledge within an enterprise' (Humphrey and Schmitz:
2000: 13). Lee and Chen (cited in Humphrey and Schmitz: 2000) are adamant that upgrading will not
occur in a subcontracted manufacturing firm unless a platform for learning is devised to 'acquire
product design and development knowledge from the outsourcing firm' enterprise' (Humphrey and
Schmitz : 2000: 13). Without this platform, knowledge can filter through a firm but fail to initiate
revolutionary upgrading within the firm.
2.1.3.4 Effect of Lead firm Governance
In a case study of the Kenyan horticulture and Tamil Nadu textile industry Dolan and Tewari (2001)
have shown that ' ...the impetus to acquire new knowledge and capabilities - has been driven to a large
extent by global buyers' (Dolan and Tewari : 2001: 101). This point is reiterated by McCormick and
Schmitz (2001) as well as Gereffi (1999 cited in Bair and Gereffi: 2001) who show that the
relationship local firms have with lead firms can affect their propensity to upgrade.
The upgrading model proposed in section 2.1.3 fails to account for the fact that ' ...[the] fate of a
member of the GCC is interdependent or interlocked with the fate of most other members.' Lead
firms in the apparel industry are not likely to encourage functional upgrading in their supply chains
beyond the level of OEM. Firstly, some lead firms invest in the capabilities of their producers and
therefore impede producers from switching to other buyers in higher value adding sectors. Secondly,
lead firms tend to be highly protective of their downstream markets and functional upgrading amongst
their suppliers would encroach on their core competence. In the footwear sector some lead firms
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physically limit the flow of knowledge to their upstream suppliers to prevent functional upgrading
(Tarn and Gereffi: 1999, Humphrey and Schmitz: 2000). As already noted, Gibbon (2000a) points out
that only 10 Hong Kong manufacturers have managed to move into branded manufacture and this
pattern of upgrading is not common in outer ring garment producing countries like Mauritius.
The limitations on upgrading experienced by both Hong Kong and Mauritian based garment firms
were partly the result of constraints induced by foreign buyers (Schmitz: 1999: 1). It follows that the
upgrading limitations on those further down the value chain (particularly CMT firms) are even greater.
While the flexible management of production networks was a major factor in the upgrading of NIC
garment firms (Gereffi: 1999a) we also see that ' ...[the] development of full-package networks in
Torreon [Mexico] is primarily benefiting a wealthy domestic elite...' (Bair and Gereffi: 200 I: 1896).
These elites receive orders from US customers but farm them out to a multitude of contractors and
subcontractors. Elite first tier suppliers are under intense pressure to supply high quality apparel on a
'Just in Time' (HT) basis at reasonable prices but devolve this pressure to sub-contractors who are
forced to pay lower wages and engage in flexible labour practices. Summarising the experience of
Torreon Jean manufacturers Gibbon (2000b) postulates that, ' ...exclusion of the many...tends to be the
other side of upgrading of the few, at least where the latter process is 'buyer driven" (Gibbon: 2000b:
6,7).
It would seem that small CMT firms have incredibly limited upgrading opportunities . This is largely
because first tier suppliers guard access to buyers and buyers in turn reinforce barriers to entry into the
design and marketing aspects of garment production. It also requires capital, time and more
importantly strategic intent to achieve these forms of product, process and functional upgrading. As a
result of upgrading limitations firms at the bottom of the value chain are forced into paths of
immiserising growth, a pattern known as the 'race to the bottom' of the value chain. With this in
mind, we move onto a discussion of the value chain upgrading opportunities available to CMT firms.
2.1.4 Upgrading in Small CMT Firms though Clustering
The inference of traditional value chain upgrading literature is that all CMT firms should attempt to
become OEMs. CMTs are a necessary component of the clothing industry and in many ways facilitate
flexibility within the sector. The challenge is to upgrade CMT firms so that they can profitably fulfil
their current roles with the long-term goal of extending them (interview with CLOFED
representative). While limited literature exists concerning upgrading in small and medium sized
enterprises (SMEs/, especially CMT firms, clustering theory offers some insight into this objective.
7 In terms of legislation, medium manufacturing enterprises consist of 50 to 200 employees. Small enterprises
of between 10 and 50. Smaller enterprises are referred to as a micro-enterprises
(www.sairr.org.zaJpublications/pub/ffl199806/entre.htm).
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In the words of Mytelka and Farinelli (2000) and an anonymous author (ccdev.lets.net): ' In recent
years, there has been an increase in interest in clusters of small firms in developing countries. They
have been viewed optimistically as a source of growth in developing countries, especially for small
firms in developing countries' (ccdev.lets.net: 1); and' ... [for] SMEs, clustering is believed to offer
unique opportunities to engage in a wide array of domestic linkages between users and producers and
between the knowledge producing sector (universities and R&D institutes) and the goods and services
producing sectors of the economy that stimulate learning and innovation' (Mytelka: 2000: 8).
The work of the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) has also shown that 'clustering has helped
small firms overcome well-known growth constraints and sell to distant markets (Schmitz: 1999: 1).
Drawing on the work of Schmitz (1995), McCormick (1998) summarises the primary benefits that can
accrue from clustering, especially for African enterprises . She says that, '[by] increasing market
access, fostering communication and information sharing, facilitating technological upgrading,
increasing efficiency, and contributing to the development of supportive institutions, clusters can build
industrial capacity' (McCormick: 1998: 7).
The 'cluster' concept emerged from Marshall's work in the 1920s and later the industrial district
literature of the 1980s and 1990s (Bair and Gereffi: 2001 and Nadvi: 1997). This latter work drew on
the experience of footwear and apparel firms in the Emilia-Romaga region of the ' so-called' third
Italy. These geographically bound firms managed to combine ' ... successful export
or social factors on the district (Albu: 1997: 17).
The industrial district model has been criticised for being a set of stylalised facts father than an
analytical model because it does not incorporate the influence of local government, external linkages
performance... with relatively high wages paid to a skilled workforce' (Bair and Gereffi: 2001: 1886).
I
1
According to Schmitz (1992 cited in McCormick: 1997) a cluster is characterised by ' ... a
geographical and sectoral agglomeration of enterprises'. Cluster theory builds on the industrial
district in that it focuses on th~ p~ive benefits that can arise from sectorally related firms operating in
close geographical proximity as well as the active benefits that can result from these firms
collaborating with one another. The former passive gains are known as 'external economies' and the
latter active gains as 'joint action'. The cluster wide advantages derived from joint action and external
economies are referred to as 'collective efficiency'.
'IMcCormick (1998) refers to external economies as the ' . . .unintended or incidental by-products of
economic action' (McCormick: 1998: 11). These include labour market pooling, development of
specialised local suppliers and services, technological diffusion and market access", By-products of
8 The last of these by-products (market access) occurs because the size of the cluster facilitates the meeting of
buyers andsellers.
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external economies can sometimes be disabling as investment often flows towards firms who are
individually successful within the cluster rather than to the whole cluster (McCormick: 1998).
Schmitz (1997 cited in McCormick: 1998) does not consider external economies to be a sufficient
criterion for clusters of firms to flourish. Conscious 'joint action' is necessary for this to occur. Joint
action can occur horizontally (for example , the sharing of capital equipment by competing firms) or
vertically (for example, collaboration on product improvement between manufacturer and buyer). It
can also occur bilaterally or multilaterally (namely, between two players or numerous player) (Albu:
1997; McCormick: 1998; Kaplinsky and Morris: 2001). The following matrix devised by Schmitz
(1997 cited in McCormick: 1998) clarifies the overlap between horizontal and vertical as well as
bilateral and multilateral collaboration.
Table 4: Matrix of joint action opportunities
Bilateral Dimension Multilateral
Two co-operators at the same More than two co-operators at
level in the production chain Horizontal the same level in the production
e.g. sharing equipment chain, e.g. sectoral association
Two co-operators at different More than two co-operators at
levels of the production chain different levels of the
e.g. a producer and a user Vertical production chain e.g. an
improving components association or alliance
composed of manufacturers and
distributors of a product.
Source: Mci.ormick: 1998: 12
As will be highlighted in section 2.1.4.2 the scope for horizontal joint action amongst CMT firms is
fairly broad. Vertical joint action, on the other hand, is sometimes difficult as full manufacturers ,
retailers and wholesalers prefer to foster arms-length relationships with their CMT suppliers. CMT
firms can however, encourage vertical joint action through implementing flexible specialization
techniques (Piore and Sabel: 1984). The central theme of the flexible specialization model is that the
success and rise in efficiency of Japanese automotive manufacturers was not as a result of automation
(as many of their western competitors assumed in the 1970s and 1980s) but rather as a result of
' ... intra-firm and inter-firm organization which overturned many of the established principles of
efficient production' (Kaplinsky: 1994: 5).
2.1.4.1 Strengthening of Vertical Ties through Flexible Specialisation
There is growing consensus that, instead of fragmenting the production value chain at the local level,
vertical chain integration will produce better development outcomes, improve product consistency and
increase exporter control over lead times (Dolan and Tewari: 2001).
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The theory of flexible speciali sation (Piore and Sabel : 1984) deals primarily with the need for
strengthening of vertical ties in the value chain and is the main analytical approach frequently
associated with clustering. The premise of the theory is that competition is no longer simply based on
price and that modern fragmented and differentiated consumer demands cannot be met using inflexible
mass production techniques. Instead quality, variety, flexibility, design and delivery have become
dominant competitive requirements and inter and intra-firm organisational changes are presented as a
high road for industries struggling to meet new competitive pressures (Bessant: 1995; Albu: 1997;
Altman: 1994). In contrast ' . .. [the] low road involves relying on low cost, short-term labour and
minimal investment. The firm grows and shrinks by hiring and firing workers in response to its
widely fluctuating order book' (Albu: 1997: 20).
While Kaplinsky (1994) outlines that ease with which flexible specialisation techniques can be
implemented in developing countries, much of the work on flexible specialisation in the developing
and developed world centres around the aeronautic and automotive industries where vertical
integration is necessary because of product standardisation requirements (Bessant: 1995; Kaplinsky:
1994; Humphrey et al: 1998; Fleury: 1999; Womack, Jones and Roos: 1990). In traditional industries
inter-firm vertical collaboration, despite being beneficial, is not a necessity and has not until recently
been promoted. Some larger clothing manufacturing firms (such as those in Mauritius) are however
seeing the benefit of vertical integration and improved supply chain management. Subcontracted
CMT firms can promote vertical integration and consolidate preferred supplier status through intra-
firm reorganisation, which requires relatively low investment. In so doing CMT firms engage in
process upgrading (as presented in Table 3). Hypothetically, once CMT firms have consolidated their
supplier status buyers might encourage further upgrading (such as ISO accreditation and electronic
data interchange to smooth lead times) and the CMT firm might be entrusted with greater
responsibility in co-ordinating production (for example, sourcing fabrics and outsourcing production)
and hence make the move from pure assembly to OEM production.
According to Humphrey et al (1998) and Kaplinsky (1994) a ' toolkit' of intra-firm organisational
changes are available to firms to improve their supplier status. These include changes in production
flow, total quality management (TQM) and continuous improvement (Cl). I will briefly expound on
each of these changes beginning with production flow.
Production flow: Large inventories of incoming material, Work in Progress (WIP) and finished goods
tend to hinder production flow and the ability of the firm to respond flexibly to orders. Incoming and
finished goods inventories are, to a large extent, out of the control of the manufacturers and dependent
on supplier capabilities and the characteristics of the market. It is however, possible for individual
firms to manage WIP in such a way to optimise the flexibility of the firm. This can be done firstly by
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activating production at one stage of the production line 'just in time' (JIT) for demand at the
subsequent stage and secondly, by reducing lot sizes to near one. This would allow for the
commencement of manufacture of a new batch without having to wait for WIP to pass through the
production line. The last recommendation for improving factory flexibility is to alter the factory floor
plan (from a production line) into a cellular layout. ' ... [In] cellular layouts, machines performing
sequences of operations are grouped together, and each part moves rapidly through the whole
sequence of operations in each cell' (Humphrey et al: 1998: 60)
TQM: Large inventories, common in mass production factories, promote poor quality, as there is
always back-up inventory if production defects emerge. In the flexible specialisation model small
inventories necessitate that each item is manufactured correctly. Individual workers are commissioned
with quality control at each stage of production instead of quality control being a function tagged onto
the end of the production line.
Continuous Improvement: In the flexible specialisation model worker are not only charged with
quality control. They must also collaborate with R&D and management divisions in identifying
incremental improvements that can be made to the production process (Humphrey et al: 1998).
Altman (1994) presents a flexible specialisation model devised specifically for the South African
clothing industry in 'An industrial strategy for the clothing industry.' In this book she identifies four
nodal points for productivity improvement that 'enhance dynamic competitiveness' . These include :
the supply of textiles, the pre-production aspects, the production related aspects and marketing. We
have already concluded that incoming inventories are difficult for CMT manufacturers to control (pre-
graded textiles, with patterns printed on, are simply delivered to these manufacturers). Marketing is
also beyond the domain of CMT operators. Consequently we focus on pre-production and production
organisational changes with the intent of strengthening vertical linkages within the garment value
chain.
In traditional CMT operations, all fabric is cut on a long cutting table usually with a hand held band
saw. Cut textiles are then sorted and stored in an inventory before passing onto the assembly line.
Assembly lines can vary from 5 to 120 workers and operate on a progressive bundle system. ' [This]
means the panels are tied into bunches of 10-60 pieces each. The operator picks up each subsequent
bundle, unties the panels, completes the required operation on each piece, re-ties these pieces into a
bundle, and pushes the bundle forward to the next operator' (Altman: 1994: 58). From this point
garments move into the cleaning and pressing division from where they are finally checked before
delivery back to the main wholesaler or manufacturer. If new garment styles are introduced for
manufacture, changeover ofmachines to suite new styles has to occur overnight.
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The problems with this inflexible manufacturing system are similar to those found in other industries
using the same system. In particular bottlenecks arise in production flow because production is
pushed along the line. Also garment defects that arise early in the production line are not detected
until right at the end of the production process and time is waisted in unpicking and resewing the
garment. Lastly, any breakdown of machinery in the production process leads to long down times.
Low skilled workers are generally not trained in preventative machinery maintenance. Altman
speculates that garments in the process of being assembled spend about half the time of the production
cycle in WIP inventories. Workers in the production line spend nearly 80% of their time handling
WIP and the rest on productive activity.
Altman (1994) recommends organisational changes that could be made at the cutting and assembly
phase of production to reduce WIP and operator handing time. These changes include firstly, the
shortening of cutting table and perhaps the introduction of more cutting tables to deal with different
styles of garments. Secondly the breaking down of long production lines into modular cells of related
tasks either in a horseshoe shape or staggered shape (horseshoe shape presented in Figure 4). 'These
systems allow small groups of employees to undertake most of the tasks associated with the assembly
of garments in one 'group' and on the set of complementary machines under the direct control of the
group. The system allowed in theory, for very quick changes of style or garment' (Winterton: 1998).
The principal benefit of the system is that each worker undertakes more of the production process,
enhancing product consistency and quality. The ideal outcome of this modular system is for single
items to pass from one stage in the production process to the next. If a problem occurs somewhere in
the cell, all workers can quickly identify the bottleneck (since they all face one another) and jointly
rectify the problem. Within the cellular layout model proposed by Altman (1994), staff loyalty is
required for maintaining cellular efficiency and quality focus.
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Figure 4: Cellular production layout in a factory manufacturing a variety of products
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2.1.4.2 Horizontal Collaboration
Horizontal joint action ' ... refers to collaboration between/amongst competitors' (McCormick: 1998:
13). Small firms can foster product, process and functional upgrading through horizontal joint action
in three ways. Firstly, and most tangibly, firms can jointly buy inputs (machinery or textiles) and/or
jointly fulfil large orders giving them access to new large volume markets . Secondly, firms can
engage in technical and market knowledge sharing activities. Lastly small firms can develop
institutions such as trade associations, sales consortia or benchmarking associations that would aid the
first two forms of horizontal collaboration. The first two forms of collaboration mentioned here tend
to be bi-lateral , while the latter is necessarily multi-lateral (Mytelka and Farinelli : 2000; Navdi: 1997;
Kaplinsky and Morris: 2001; Albu: 1997).
There are some negative aspects to horizontal joint action. Navdi (1997) warns that there is a thin line
between collaboration and competition and in some cases might result in price wars and other
destructive action. Also, some horizontal joint action (in the areas of marketing, design or accessing
export markets) might be directly opposed by buyers.
While clustering has definite impacts on the productivity and competitiveness of traditional sectors (as
Mytelka and Farinelli [2000] show in their analysis of the spectacle and furniture clusters of Italy and
Denmark respectively) the assumed benefits of clustering lie to a large extent out reach of CMT firms.
While I have discussed methods to encourage vertical joint action, McCormick (1998) states that small
CMT plants have little to gain from collaboration with buyers. There is however, some prospect for
upgrading in CMT firms through horizontal joint action . The Garment Manufacturing Association
(GMA) in Cape Town (an association of 40 CMT operators) is a case at hand. This association is
active in industrial relations, screening imported inputs, small firm development and the dissemination
of information into the CMT sector. The GMA is also a common source of information for buyers
requiring the services of specialised CMT firms. This has led to the sharing of orders and passing on
of work (McCormick: 1998).
21
2.1.4.3 The Importance of Context
While clustering has many intrinsic benefits for the firms involved and can in some way overcome the
hindrances to upgrading imposed by buyers, the extent to which upgrading can flow from clustering is
dependent on a number of factors. These include the nature and size of the product market (namely, is
there a market for the product and is the market big enough); available economies of scale and scope
(namely, do firms have the capacity to meet large or diversified product market demands); and
institutions governing exchange relations (namely, do institutions promote trusting cluster
relationships and enforce contracts) (McCormick: 1998). Mytelka and Farinelli (2001) also propose
that the success of traditional clusters in Europe were to a large part reliant on government support.
- - - - _._------ p
-==-E~rn~;t~gant;-creat~-;;~and industrial parks, incubators, export processing
zones and technopoles in the 1970s. In Belluno, Italy, the government was instrumental in fostering
collaboration in the spectacle cluster which ultimately led to the creation of a number of organizations
including: a technical school, a certification institute, a local service and information centre, an
observatory and an industrial museum and foundation (Mytelka and Farinelli: 2000: 23).
Whilst it would seem that an effective model for upgrading in small CMT clothing factories in the
developing world has been formulated, one pivotal factor has been overlooked. Upgrading will not
occur without the support and drive of employees. A move towards labour market flexibility is
sweeping the third world and this could seriously effect employee motivation to assist the upgrading
process. With this in mind we undertake a deeper analysis of global labour market flexibility.
2.2 Labour Market Flexibility
In the early stages of the industrial revolution in Europe manufacturing processes tended to be craft
orientated and fairly flexible. Simple home-based technologies were used to manufacture short runs
of non-standard items (particularly textiles). Rigidities began to emerge as manufacturing moved into
the gambit of the factory. These rigidities reached a pinnacle with the production of the first model T
Ford in 1913. Drawing on the principles of Frederick Taylor's 'Scientific Management' (1911) and
new technologies , Henry Ford devised a model of manufacturing based on the systematic division of
labour and the standardization of tasks and operating procedures. He used these in the manufacture of
the Model-T (Bessant: 1995).
The years after the production of the first Model-T were years of bloodshed (as a result of the world
wars) and unemployment (The Great Depression of 1929 - 1931). Fear of fascism was rife in Western
Europe and the United States. The spread of Taylorist manufacturing principles however, made it
plausible for politicians to conceive a long-term development plan based on the protection of the
working man. The 'welfare state' arose as the dominant model in pursuit of these goals. This model
was based on concepts developed by Keynes in his 'General Theory' (1936). Keynes (although not
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anti-capitalist) believed that capitalism was unstable and that the rules of the game needed to be
changed in order to strengthen the system and to ensure full-employment.
The 1938 Swedish welfare state model was a variant on Keynes' theory in that just under full-
employment was the goal to keep a hold on inflationary pressure. In all variations of the welfare state
model, '...the labour market was underpinned by the welfare state, based on social insurance and the
premise that state transfers would be required primarily to cover temporary interruptions in earning
power' (Standing: 1999: 54). Labour regulation in this era was neo-corporatist, namely, regulations
were statutory and pro-collective, backed by voice regulation through unions and employer
organisations. In developed and developing countries there was also the presumption that economic
security could supplement labour security and so countries tended to protect themselves from
excessive competition from imports.
By the 1970s the welfare state was beginning to show flaws. It was felt that welfare bred passivity and
dependence and, '...rising social security contributions increased the cost of labour which in turn
undermined the competitiveness of European economies in international markets' (Bax: 1996: 2).
Keynesian economic principles were proving to be ineffective in the face of declining growth after the
1973 oil crisis and so by the 1980s and 90s there was a growing neo-liberal consensus that monetarist
and supply-side economics were the way forward. This neo-liberal revolution was fuelled in part by
the work of Milton Friedman (1982 cited in Bax: 1996) who speculated that rising unemployment was
the result of inflexible labour markets and called for a reduction in social security, the neutralisation of
labour law and the restraint of labour unions. The policy prescriptions emanating from this revolution
have included the deregulation of labour markets and the retreat of the welfare state (Bax: 1996; Lee:
1997).
Despite there being some scepticism about the correlation between labour market regulation (or lack
thereof), economic growth trends, unemployment and productivity neo-liberal anti protectionist ideas
were transplanted from the industrialised countr ies to developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s
through structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). In Latin America many of these programmes were
implemented by the international financing institutions as conditionalities for loans rendered after the
1973 oil crises. These programmes tended to undermine unions in the public sector, because state
assets were privatised, and in the private sector, because many enterprises could not survive without
state protection from imports. Surviving private corporations sought to maintain their competitive
edge by hiring employees who were less likely to join unions and who could be hired using flexible
contracts. Despite pressure to introduce pro-social protectionist measures, most Latin American states
generally introduced flexible labour regulation reforms in the 1980s and 1990s (Bronstein: 1997).
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The preceding account of global labour market trends, tends to be in keeping with Standing's (1999)
theory that, '...[historically] all labour systems have evolved through flexible and more 'rigid' (or
stable) phases, the rigid collapsing into more flexible forms, and flexible practices stabilising through
the establishment and legitimation of norms and regulations, until these have fettered the development
of production' (Standing: 1999: 49).
2.2.1 Organisational and Employment Flexibility
While growing labour market flexibility over the past 30 years has largely been influenced by flagging
global growth rates, large organizations have also forcefully promoted flexible labour practices
through increasing organisational flexibility. In an effort to reduce co-ordination and labour costs (by
side-stepping national social protection systems) and increase market flexibility many large and
medium sized firms are tending to contract out their employment function to internationally dispersed
smaller firms. These firms have in turn increased their flexibility by outsourcing to subcontractors or
home-workers. The trend towards organisational flexibility has lead to the web like extension of
global value chains more widely discussed in the section 2.1 of this dissertation.
An inevitable offshoot of organisational flexibility (aided by weakening labour protection) has been
that employment arrangements have become increasingly contingent, atypical or flexible
(www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/techmeet/tmlfiOO/tmlfir.htm). Carnoy et al (1997)
describe employment flexibility as, '...the idea of labour employed under a contract that no longer
provides full time, long term security and that seeks, instead, greater flexibility to move in and out of
the employment relationship' (Carnoy et al: 1997: 32). Standing (1999) adds that '...Employment
flexibility reflects the ability of firms to hire and dismiss workers easily and at low cost...' (Standing:
1999: 101). Standing's definition draws attention to the fact that employment flexibility is a conscious
strategic action used by employers to transfer the fluctuations and risks associated with production to
the level of the worker (Bax: 1996).
Although it is not true for all firms there is a tendency for manufacturing and other firms to distance
themselves from long-term commitments to workers. It is difficult to model the plethora of flexible
employment arrangements that firms have developed but Table 5 below gives some idea of the most
prominent emergent arrangements.
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Casual labourers are hired without an employment contract and arc typically paid
on a piece rate. Temporary workers have a fixed term contract or are rehired on a
rolling basis. Recently permanent temporaries have emerged, who are, '...expected
to stay with a firm for many years but who lack the benefits and entitlements of
regular or 'permanent' employees' (Standing: 1999). Temporary employment is
generally only used by employers to protect themselves from risk and is bad for
employees in that they are exposed to the insecurity once borne by firms (De Grip:
1997).
'This is a relatively small but significant form of flexible employment. They
include self-employed individuals with a niche skill, including management
consulting, and in general deserve to be identified as a distinct group because they
are not like most other forms of ,self-employment" (Standing: 1999).
'Large corporations have 'out-sourced' more activities to small-scale, semi-
independent businesses. These may be family firms or even individuals , who do
not work for the enterprises directly for a wage but who are in a dependent relation
to one or several large enterprises , typically paid on a piece-rate or job-work basis'
(Standing: 1999).
'These may become the major form of employment for a wide array ofjobs.
Increasingly, firms are contracting out the employment function by turning to
private employment agencies' (Standing : 1999).
'Home workers should not be confused with self-employed workers. Home
workers are typically subject to high rates of exploitation and are dependent on
work contracted out to them. They are often missed by labour regulations, have no
union protection and are easily pushed into 'economic inactivity" (Standing: 1999).
Teleworkers, '...work primarily through the use of computers and other advanced
information technology. Although they work from home, and therefore could be
said to belong to the category of home workers , it is useful to keep them as a
distinct category because they have greater control over their skills, means of
production and labour' (Standing : 1999).
'The general definition of a part time worker is someone who works below 30
hours a week. This time period varies and the distinction is often quite dubious
between part-time and full time work. Part-time work can be voluntary (for
instance when a parent prefers to work half day) or involuntary (for instance when
a worker is forced to work 'short-time')' (Standing: 1999).
'These comprise a rapidly growing form of flexible labour. These are employed
informally in the 'grey' or 'black' economy, often illegally. Reasons include tax
evasion and avoidance, and a desire to avoid bureaucratic paperwork.' (Standing:
1999).
Denved from Standmg: 1999: 101-112 and De Gnp et al: 1997.
25
The use of flexible employment practices (especially the use of temporary or casual labour) is most
pervasive in developing countries and forms much of the comparative advantage of manufacturing
firms in these regions. Data collected by Standing (1999 ) shows that atypical emplo yment
arrangements (especially casualisation) are increasing rapidly in many emerging economies (Albania,
Bulgaria, Russia, Ukraine , Chile , India , Malaysia, Philippines and South Africa). The use of
temporary and casual labour is however not confined to firms in developing countries and over the
past three decades non-regular forms of employment have soared throughout the developed world
(Figure 5).
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Much of the increase in temporary or casual work in the developed world is as a result of the shift to
service industries away from manufacturing in these economies. Many who formerly had full-time
employment in the manufacturing sector must accept less secure employment or none at all.
2.2.2 Employment Flexibility as a Development Issue
The nature of flexible employment arrangements has important outcomes for the security of workers
and national economies. The outcomes of employment flexibility rely specifically on whether they are
demand (employer) or supply (employee) driven (Fryer and Newham: 2000). Where skills are scarce
and demand for skills is high, outcomes of flexible employment arrangements will generally be
advantageous. This is definitely the case in Silicon Valley, Orange County, USA where highly skilled
engineers and programmers move between firms gaining experience and in the process diffusing
technological information in the region. In some cases employers consider labour market flexibility to
be too volatile for management, however it is questionable whether the sector would survive or thrive
without this high volatility (Camoy: 1999)
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Conversely, in sectors where skills are plentiful or low skilled workers are required, outcomes of
flexible employment arrangements will tend to be detrimental. Wages will be low, there will be a lack
of social protection and few career opportunities. Staff turnover will tend to be high (De Grip et al:
1997). If countries base their competitive advantage on a plentiful supply of flexible or low skilled
labour (as many developing countries do) they run the risk of achieving little more than immiserising
growth (as discussed in section 2.1.2).
Trade liberalisation has increased global competition in the sectors where flexible employment is most
valued and indeed necessary if firms are to remain competitive (for example the clothing industry).
The result is that flexible practices have multiplied exponenti ally in recent times, especially in the
developing world. This has proved detrimental to labour security and to national economic outcomes.
Due to these negative factors questions have emerged regarding the assumed positive correlation
between labour market deregulation (and ensuing loss of labour protection) and global
competitiveness especially since equity is ignored in this correlation (Standing : 1999; Lee: 1997, De
Grip et al: 1997). In response to this, some discussion has emerged in the ILO regarding placing a
social clause on all global trade (Lee: 1997).
2.2.3 Employment Flexibility in the Clothing Industry
ILO reports published over the last few years point to the fact that employment flexibility is
particularly prevalent in the clothing, footwear and textile sectors because of rapid fashion changes
and low skill and technological requirements . While employment has remained fairly stable in formal
sectors since the 1980s, ' ... the informal sector promotes a growing volume of employment in
developing countries, especially i n clothing and footwear'
(www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/pr/96-33 .htrn).InI996 the Deputy Director General of the
ILO estimated that while there were 23.6 million formal workers in the global clothing, footwear and
textiles industries. The informal workforce accounted for five to 10 times that number. Without the
protection of labour law and collective bargaining, informal enterprises are little more than sweatshops
employing predominantly female workers at low wages (www.ilo .org/public/englishlbureau/inf/pr/96-
33.htrn; www.ilo.org/public/englishlbureaulinf/pr/2000/38.htrn).
The nature of flexible employment practices and the reason they occur so prominently in the industries
under discussion is outlined in the ILO's report on 'Labour Practices in the Footwear, Leather,
Textiles and Clothing Industries' (2000). This report outlines how, in the last few decades , garment
production along with employment has shifted from the developed to developing countries. Asia has
benefited particularly from this shift and in 1998 possessed 66.2 percent of global employment in the
garment industry compared to 44,7 percent in 1995. There is, however fierce competition amongst
developing countries to attract investors in the garment industry primarily through keeping labour
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costs low. One method of doing this is through creating Export Processing Zones (EPZ), such as those
in Sri Lanka, where special tax incentives are offered to investors and adherence to labour legislation
is waived. New criteria for competitiveness (especially those of flexibility and quality) mean that
many Asian countries are struggling to maintain their position as principal suppliers of the European
and North American markets. Instead, countries in close proximity to these markets are attracting a
greater market share. In response Asian manufacturers are trying to improve their flexibility by
fragmenting the supply chain and devolving the responsibility for flexible supply to subcontractors.
This has lead to greater employment instability III the sector
(www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/techmeet/tmlfiOO/tmlfir.htm).
Recent unpublished studies conducted in Asia show that there are striking similarities in
subcontracting and flexible employment arrangements used by garment firms in the Kurunegala
district in Sri Lanka, the Philippians, the Ahmedabad region in India and Bangkok, Thailand in the
face of global competition (Jayaweera et al: 1999; Ofreneo et al: 1999; Boonmathya et al: 1999; Unni
et al: 1999). All these economies (except India) underwent a transition from Import Substitution to
Export Orientation in the 1970s and 1980s. In Sri Lanka the features of this transition included:
liberalization of imports and foreign exchange; liberalization of the price mechanism; reduction or
elimination of consumer subsidies; withdrawal of the government from direct commercial and
production activity; promotion of direct foreign investment; and active encouragement of labour
migration (Jayaweera et al: 1999). Further liberalization of these economies came in the 1980s and
1990s with the implementation of SAPs by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a conditionality
for loans rendered.
Liberalisation of Asian economies 'resulted in an increase in cross country production linkages and
subcontracting relationships ... These production strategies have lead to a set of secondary
contradictory linkages with the hinterland, for provision of requisite material and service inputs or for
finishing, labelling and packaging. A further spin-off is the evolution of a second tier of smaller
subcontractors who are called in when there are excess orders' (Jayaweera: 1999: 7-8). These
strategies are used predominantly to access cheap labour and to evade labour legislation. In Sri Lanka
for example, the failure to register contract labour has lead to enterprises' ... capitalising on loopholes
in law and administrative machinery' (Jayaweera: 1999: 7). In India state policies that restrict the
growth oflarge industry have also encouraged sub-contracting relationships (Unni et al: 1999).
Subcontracting arrangements in these four Asian countries vary slightly (Figure 6). Generally
however, large enterprises in all four areas manufacture for foreign retailers . These enterprises may
undertake all production themselves or may farm production out to smaller factories. In some cases
large enterprises do not undertake any production themselves but provide textiles and other
components to subcontractors who assemble the garments. In this case the large enterprises are
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referred to as wholesalers and the subcontractors as CMT firms. Often CMT firms will further
subcontract work to home workers or row house workers. This is done during peak production times
or to minimize the risk faced by subcontracted firms threatened by fluctuating demand and low prices.
In India large enterprises subcontract work directly to home-workers or row house shops of 10 to 20
people. Alternatively subcontractors, who have no production facilities, act as intermediaries between
small factories and large enterprises. Smaller factories are preferred because, 'factories employing 10
workers with power or 20 workers without power must register under the Indian Factory Act of 1948'
(Unni: 1999: 6). Smaller, unregistered firms can get by without adherence to labour legislation and
collective bargaining agreements. (Jayaweera et al: 1999; Ofreneo et al: 1999; Boonmathya et al:
1999; Unni et al: 1999).
Figure 6: Stylised diagram of the clothing manufacture value chain in Sri Lanka, the Philippines, India
and Thailand
CMT subcontractors! Intermediary
Home worker! Row house factory
Employment throughout subcontracting chains is precarious especially at the lower end of these
chains. In India the majority of workers in the garment industry are casuals and earn a daily or piece
rate wage". The picture is similar in Sri Lanka where, although UK retailers insist on high minimum
standards, labour exploitation is often hidden in subcontracted firms. 'The field study [of Sri Lankan
garment firms] provided evidence that minimum wages, statutory working hours, maternity leave and
worker's rights were not enforced with respect to these ... [subcontract] ... workers' (Jayaweera: 7:
1999). About 20% of embroidery workers in Sri Lanka were found to earn below 1500 rupees (2500
rupees being the minimum wage). Subcontractors in all regions discussed had little control over the
price they charged for garment production and in turn how much they could pay workers (Jayaweera
et al: 1999; Ofreneo et al: 1999; Boonmathya et al: 1999; Unni et al: 1999).
9 The plight of home-workers in India is brought to life in the novel 'A Fine Balance' by Rohinton Mistry
(1995) which records the lives of two fictitious home workers struggling to survive in the 1970s during the
Indian 'State ofEmergency'.
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Having discussed the dynamics of clothing industry employment flexibility in the developing world I
ask the question - is upgrading possible in this context of atypical employment and poverty amongst
clothing workers? Standing (1999) and Bax (1996) both propose that employees with precarious
employment contracts will have less firm loyalty and might actively counter firm upgrading strategies
by neglecting machinery or reducing effort. In such situations employers have to rely on ' . ..a system
of formal and explicit rules' to motivate staff contradicting many of the assumptions in the flexible
specialisation model. Using the first five waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS)
conducted over the period 1991-1995 Arulampalam and Booth (1997) also show that ' ...workers on
short-term employment contracts, or who are not covered by as union collective agreement, are
significantly less likely to be involved in work-related training to improve or increase their skills.'
What effect then, does employment flexibility have on the emerging upgrading model?
2.3 A Model for CMT Value Chain Upgrading in the Context of Employment
Flexibility
In section 2.1.3 of this paper it was concluded that product, process and functional upgrading in small
CMT firms was hindered by a number of factors, most notably oppressive governance relationships . It
was however proposed that that lead-firm opposition to upgrading could be overcome by creating
horizontal ties between firms and encouraging vertical ties through the implementation of certain
intra-firm organizational changes (most specifically, implementation of the cellular factory layout
which would necessitate staff training) . In this instance upgrading would depend on the nature and
size of the product market (is there a market for the product and is the market big enough); available
economies of scale and scope (do firms have the capacity to jointly meet large or diversified product
market demands); institutions governing exchange relations (do institutions promote trusting cluster
relationships and enforce contracts) and government policies that promote clustering in the industry.
Even if all these criteria were met one would still need to understand that a sense of insecurity
amongst staff could undermine any upgrading initiatives. Having explored all these considerations I
present a model for value chain upgrading in CMT firms in the context of employment flexibility
(Figure 7).
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Figure 7: Upgrading model for CMT firms using flexible employment contracts
Constraints on Traditional
Upgrading Model including:
extemal contingencies, lack of





Economies of Scale and Scope
Market size and nature
Before applying the upgrading model presented above to a sample of CMT manufacturing firms
operating in Durban, South Africa (to ascertain what steps they and other actors could take to promote
upgrading in the sector) we need to consider the context and historical background of the Durban
CMT sector to inform analysis of data and the resulting policy prescriptions.
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3 Context: The South African clothing manufacturing industry
with specific reference to Durban CMT clothing manufacturers
A diagrammatic version of the South African clothing industry value chain as it appeared in 1998 is
presented below (Figure 8). Included in this diagram are employer, employee, production output,
export and import levels for all links in the clothing value chain.
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Source: Clofed Newsletter, No 65, December 1999: 61
Of particular note in this diagram is the fact that the South African clothing manufacturing sector
functions primarily to service the domestic industry with 92% of turnover coming from the local retail
sector. Five per cent of retailers account for 50% of this turnover. While imports of clothing only
slightly exceed exports in monetary value, most imports come from countries that produce low end of
the range goods (Malawi, China, India) meaning that the volume of imports is probably larger than the
monetary value would indicate. This is of concern to South African CMT operators that function
particularly to serve the middle and lower market segment.
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The clothing industry is an integral component of the South African economy. 'As at 1998, formal
output (actual value of sales) of the industry was estimated at +/- US$ 2 billion. This constitutes some
2% of the GDP. If the informal sector contribution is included, this may increase to +/- US$ 3
billion ... According to statistics there are approximately 1 600 formal clothing manufacturers,
employing some 133 000 people. Including the informal sector, however, there may be as many as
2000 manufacturers employing some 200 000 people' (Clofed Newsletter, No 65, December 1999:
62).
Having presented an overview of the South African clothing industry, we now shift attention to the
background of the industry and the emergence of the CMT sub-sector within the industry.
3.1 Background to the Durban CMT Sector
From early beginnings, competitiveness in the South African clothing industry (and more specifically
the Durban clothing industry) was based on the exploitation of labour and protection from the
international market place. While Britain supplied the majority of clothing to the South African
market prior to 1925, import tariffs (as part of the import replacement programme) spurred the
industry in the proceeding years (Netshitomboni: 1996).
As a result of import substitution and the lack of international competition the industry became
increasingly uncompetitive. At the macro level, apparel pipeline competitiveness never developed and
in 1982 the National Productivity Institute (commissioned to investigate the productivity of the
apparel and textile industries) ' ...declared that heavy protection of the textile industry had weakened
the competitiveness of the clothing industry' (Netshitomboni: 1996: 57). Some of the problems
associated with the textile industry included long lead times, incorrect deliveries and the unavailability
of certain fabrics (Netshitomboni: 1996). As a result of textile supply inefficiencies clothing firms
struggled to meet the stringent price and delivery time demands of a small group of dominant retailers
(which now include Edgars Group, Pepkor, Foshinis, Speciality Stores and Wooltru). (Harrison: 1996:
36)
One cannot blame pipeline inefficiencies completely for the uncompetitiveness of the South African
clothing industry. Individual firms also failed to set the industry on an early upgrading trajectory.
Scientific production systems (Fordist) only began to be implemented in the industry in the early
1940s and most firms made little attempt to engage in any form of product upgrading from their
establishment. This was particularly the case in Durban where firms tended to manufacture for the
middle to lower market prior to the Second World War. During this era, the striped Japanese shirt was
the dominant product and after the 1950s Durban firms concentrated specifically on manufacturing
33
low design content garments such as pyjamas. Cape Town firms on the other hand were
manufacturing high quality shirts and pyjamas from the 1930s. (Netshitomboni: 1996)
Despite its uncompetitiveness the clothing industry had become the third most important industry in
South Africa in terms of employment by the 1950s. Without the threat of international competition
employers increasingly based firm competitiveness on cheap labour, which according to Altman
(1994), was a static response to competitive pressure. As early as the 1930s white labour had begun to
leave the clothing industry as clerical jobs opened up to them. The African labour that replaced them
were employed at lower wages.
Wage competition was encouraged by the government through a series of decentralisation policies
which encouraged firms to move production to the borders of African homelands outside of the
jurisdiction of industrial council areas (where minimum wages were enforced) and where the supply of
cheap labour was plentiful (Netshitomboni: 1996)10.
Decentralisation began in earnest in 1953 with the Tomlinson Commission , which hoped to curb the
flow of African labour into cities in keeping with racist Apartheid Policies of the ruling National
Party. In the first decentralisation policy of the early 1960s incentives were offered to industrialists to
relocate their operation to areas adjacent to Bantustans. Initial decentralisation policies failed to meet
their original objectives and so in 1967, the Physical Planning Act sought to restrict the growth of
labour intensive industries, in urban centres, by requiring urban-based manufacturers to seek
permission if they wished to employ more African staff. Rather than shifting firms to the Bantustans,
employment declined dramatically in the Transvaal but rose in Durban and to a lesser extent in Cape
Town because these cities were exempt from expansion restrictions due to their close proximity to the
Bantustans. In 1982, having seen the failure of forced relocation, the government once again tried to
encourage relocation to decentralised areas through offering generous incentives. These incentives did
encourage relocation of both nationally and foreign based capital. Taiwanese clothing firms in
particular took advantage of relocation incentives. By the late 1980s abuse of incentives was
widespread and recommendations were made by a panel of experts to allow market forces to
determine firm location. These recommendations were implemented in the form of the Regional
Industrial Development Programme (RIDP) of 1987 (Netshitomboni: 1996).
The proportion of firms operating in decentralised areas was particularly marked in the kwaZulu-Natal
(KZN) region. The reason for this trend was that price factors were central to the survival of Durban
firms and wage levels were considerably lower in decentralised areas (Figure 9). Hammarsdale was
10 From the 1930s merchants had already begun to buy fabric and other inputs and outsource the manufacturing
component to small , unregistered, Indian owned firms outside of wage determination areas to lower their wage
bill (Nctshitomboni: 1996).
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one of the first decentralised areas to flourish under decentralisation policies. After the introduction of
the 1982 incentives package, Isithebe, Madadeni and Ezakheni rose in prominence (Harrison: 1996).









Source: Derived from Harrison: 1996: 37
While many clothing firms relocated to decentralised areas in an attempt to lower their wage bill,
others began outsourcing work to CMT clothing firms in the greater Durban area. CMT firms did not
engage in any design or sourcing of material but could assemble garments at highly competitive
prices. Whilst full manufacturers had dominated the industry up till the 1960s, retailers began to buy
their own textiles and subcontract the manufacture of their designs to CMT firms hence eroding the
power of full manufacturers (Harrison and Dunne: 1998). It was recorded in Harrison's (1996) study
that 300 out of 420 clothing manufacturers in Durban central were CMTs employing roughly 20 000
of the 27 000 strong workforce. The market succession of CMT plants in KZN is captured in the
following graph (Figure 10), which shows that while more full manufacturers were established up till
the 1980s, the establishment of CMT firms became the norm in the 1990s.
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Source: Harrison and Dunne: 1998: 8
Whilst most CMT firms are located in Durban, some have relocated to decentralised areas, especially
on the South Coast of KZN, where wages are 40% of those in the Bargaining Council Areas (Harrison
and Dunne: 1998). CMT firms located in the greater Durban area are the focus of this dissertation.
Dunlop (1993, cited in Moorhead: 2000) points out that ' the major characteristics of a national
industrial relations system appear to be established at a relatively early stage in the development of a
country.' This has indeed been the case in South Africa where an early focus on wage flexibility as a .
major component of competitiveness drove firm level, institutional and governmental actions to the
end of the 1980s. This was detrimental to the Durban clothing industry and particularly small CMT
operators, as we shall see in the remainder of this chapter.
3.2 Government Policy with Regard to Durban CMT Sector
3.2.1 Trade and Industrial Policy: National and International
Prior to political reform in South Africa in the early 1990s industrial policy was demand orientated
(protectionist) and based on the protection of local industry through import substitution . In this era,
Chang (1998) describes industrial policy as politically unacceptable and economically unsustainable
and goes on to argue that it was ' ... burdened with many objectives that ultimately undermined it in the
long run' (Chang: 1998: 51). Powerful business partners only had to display that they could not
compete against ordinarily priced imports for tariff levels to be altered (Valodia: 1999; Chang: 1998)
In dramatic contrast to previous decades the general policy with regard to South African trade in the
1990s has been that of liberalisation in accordance with the countrie s commitment to GATT. The
assumption is that cutting protection and reducing tariff levels encourages a country to export
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according to its comparative advantage (Feenstra: 1998). In South Africa, liberalisation has been
supplemented with ' limited generic supply side support for industry' (Hirschsohn: 2000) as promoted
in the two industrial policy framework documents for South Africa published in the first half of the
1990s. The first of these documents was the Congress of South African Trade Union's (COSATU)
'Industrial Strategy Project Document - Improving Manufacturing Performance in South Africa'. This
document influenced the 1995 'Support Measures for the Enhancement of the International
Competitiveness of South Africa's Industrial Sector'. In these documents the flexible specialisation
model was proposed as the basis for the development of supply-side industrial support measures with
the ultimate goal being to raise productivity. (Chang: 1998; Padayachee: 1997). The documents also
supported a restructured generalised export incentive scheme (GElS) in the short term (to be phased
out by 1997) followed by a longer term' .. .free trade regime for exporters (through a general system
of rebates and duty drawbacks)' (Paydayachee: 1997: 12).
Liberalisation in the clothing sector began in part during the 1980s when the apartheid government
introduced a SAP as a response to the intensification of international competition. This SAP included
the phasing down of tariffs and the provision of marketable 'duty-free import permits based on the
achievement of very modest exports.' The SAP was an abysmal failure in terms of the negative effect
it had on employment and it is reported that only' " .28% of SAP duty free permits issued to clothing
exporters were used to import fabric .. .Instead of importing raw materials, exporters settled for a more
lucrative option of importing low end of the market made up garments duty free' (Netshitomboni:
1996: 53). Attempts to develop a more comprehensive industrial policy began unsuccessfully in the
1990s with the Hatty .Commission. In 1992 however the minister of Trade and Industry (minister
Keys) established the Panel and Task Group for the Textile and Clothing Industries (the Swart
Commission) , which was to have more lasting influence.
'The [Swart] Commission included representatives from SACTWU, the textile and clothing sectors,
raw material suppliers, retailers, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Board of Trade and
Tariffs (BTT) and the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) . ..The Swart Commission ' s final
recommendations intended that the negative impact of tariff reductions would be counteracted by the
positive impact of various supply-side measures to support restructuring and enable the two sectors to
compete internationally' (Hirschsohn et al: 2000 : 70). The proposed sector-specific supply side
measures were deemed unaffordable and the clothing industry only qualified for general supply side
measures in the final plan for the sector produced in 1995. According to Hirschsohn et al (2000), the
implementation of measure s proposed in this plan has lagged behind the phase down of tariffs (which
has occurred at a quicker rate and to levels below those required in terms of GATT). The independent
authority (Textile and Clothing Authority [TCA]) charged with implementing supply side measures
and evaluating their impact had also been sidelined. Instead, the collection and handling of data from
the textile and clothing industries has become the responsibility of an independent consultant.
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The most lasting spin-off of the Swart Commission has been the Duty Credit Certificate (DCC)
Scheme. 'A [DCC] is awarded by [the Department of] Trade and Industry to exporting companies.
For each rand a company exports, a 30-cent rebate is given in the form of a DCC permit. When
importing, the accumulated amount during that year is set off as credit against the import duties'
(www.dispatch.co.za!2000/06 /05/easterncape/BWAVERLY.HTM). For many exporters, profit
making is now absolutely reliant on DCCs (personal interviews with large clothing manufacturers).
Whilst trade liberalisation has in many ways invigorated the clothing manufacturing sector'",
Padayachee (1997) questions whether a commitment to free trade supplemented with limited industrial
support even constitutes an industrial policy. Feenstra (1998) criticises South African industrial policy
by saying that the supposed benefits of trade liberalisation are based on the existence of perfect market
conditions. When import tariffs on goods penetrating the South African market were reduced the
customs and exise system, which once controlled imports into the country, collapsed. The market was
left open to import dumping, particularly from countries manufacturing cheap products. Employees
once involved in the local production of these goods were, in many cases, retrenched. The demand for
higher value added goods was hence undercut and the reliance on cheap, imported goods was
reinforced (interview with CLOFED representative).
In the clothing industry trade liberalisation had the effect of reducing the competitiveness of large full
manufacturers (particularly those producing for the low market range). Many of these firms became
importers of garments or outsourcers of production (rather than manufacturers) to cope with waning
profits and uncertain demand. They outsourced work to CMT firms that have to compete directly
against cheap imports from China, Malawi, India and Hong Kong (the four major importers into the
South African market) without the benefits of technological investment, training, market knowledge,
sufficient managerial skills, a stable policy environment or the effective implementation of policy by
competent individuals. CMT manufacturers have sought to become more competitive through
lowering labour costs. They have done this through shedding formal employees (formal employment
in the Natal clothing industry dropped from about 38 000 to 20 000 between 1996 and 2000) and (
\.
thereafter engaging in atypical employment practices in order to reduce social insurance expenditure. r:
(interview with CLOFED and NCMA representatives, www.clofed.co.zalstats.htm; Theron and
Godfrey: 2000)
Despite the negative outlook for clothing manufacturers under the new trade and industrial regime,
some hope does exist in the form of the 2000 US Africa Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) as
well as the SA-EU free trade agreement (FTA). AGOA and the FTA provide South African clothing
11 Clothing exports increased from R 400million to R 1,8billion between 1995 and 2001 (interview with
CLOFED representative).
38
exporters with duty-free, quota-free access to the US/EU markets provided that African inputs are
used. It is hoped that if South African clothing exporters take advantage of the FTA and AGOA,
vertical integration and learning by doing will be encouraged (Gibbon: 2001b). Speakers at an intra-
African trade promotion programme organised by the International Trade Centre warned that if
African clothing manufacturers did not take advantage of AGOA soon, the industry would lose one of
its biggest advantages, ' ... because the quotas on Chinese imports to the US would ... fall away at the
end of 2004, leaving duty-free imports the only advantage for Africa under the act until it expires in
2008' (www.bharattextiles.com/newsitems/1978244).
3.2.2 Labour policy
Labour market policy and legislation has undergone widespread reform since the democratic transition
in South Africa. In this new era all legislation pertaining to labour must be approved by NEDLAC (a
corporatist body involving government, business, labour and community). The two main instruments
of labour legislation that have emerged from NEDLAC are the Labour Relations Act (LRA) of 1995
and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) of 1997 (House and Williams : 2000) .
The objective of the LRA is to govern the relationships between employers and employees and their
representative organisations (namely, trade unions and employer organisations) through the system of
collective bargaining. According to the Act, collective bargaining occurs at industry specific
Bargaining Councils between the majority of employers and employees. Once agreements are reached
at the bargaining council (such as the minimum wage in a given industry) they are binding for all
parties in an industry, regardless of participation in the bargaining process (Valodia: 2000 and Fryer
and Newham: 2000). The second arm of labour legislation, the BCEA, ' .. .provides for ... minimum
standards for those who are not subject to collective bargaining. . . ' (Valodia: 2000: 11).
Criticism of labour legislation and its implementation in South Africa is widespread. Of particular
importance in this dissertation is the non-representativeness of bargaining agreements as laid out in the
LRA of 1995. South African bargaining councils tend to be dominated by big businesses that set
minimum wage levels for specific industries through discussion with unions and government. Small
businesses cannot afford wages set by larger firms because they do not possess the economies of scale
and as a result seek to avoid bargaining agreements 12. Figure 11 illustrates the decline in employee
and employer membership of the BCCI (Natal) in the 1990s.
12 The BCCI (Natal) attempted to increase the flexibility of wage structures during 2001 by implementing a
dual wage band to encourage reintegration of CMT firms into bargaining agreements. In the Durban clothing
industry the minimum wage as set by the bargaining council was between R341 and R44l per week at the time
that research for this dissertation was conducted. It has since risen to between R390 and R465.25 (Interview
with Bcer representative).
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Source: The Clothing Federation of South Africa Handbook: 1998
Small firms avoid bargaining council agreements either through relocation outside of bargaining
council agreements or through redefining the status of their employees so that they do not have to
comply with agreements reached at the bargaining council". Employment status can be redefined
because of confusion over the definition of an ' employee' in the LRA. An employee is defined as
anyone who works for another person or is entitled to recei ve remuneration except for independent
contractors. From this, the conclusion can be made that if employer and employee agree upon it, the
employee can become an independent contractor. The employer is therefore exempt from adhering to
collective bargaining agreements, contributing to the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) or from
providing adequate pension and medical aid for the labourer (Valodia: 2000, Fryer and Newham:
2000, Theron and Godfrey : 2000, Fakude: 2000) .
Despite wide exploitation of the definitional problems with the term ' employee ' in the LRA
(particularly by COFESA as will be discussed in section 3.3.4) amendments to the LRA and BCEA
released in July 2000 (and gazetted on the 1st of August 2002) are aimed, amongst other things, at
curbing exploitation of traditional employment contracts. In the amendments a list of criteria has been
developed to ascertain whether an employment relationship exi sts. ' Independent contractors will be
reg arded as employees and 'clients' will be regarded as their employers, in any of the following
instances: if their hours of work or manner of work are controlled by their clients, if they are
economically dependent on their clients, if they form part of the clients organisation, if they have
worked for the client for more than 40 hours during the last three months, if their tools or equipment
are provided by the client or if they render services to one client only' (www.cofesa.co.za).
13 'According to a study of South Africa's labour market conducted by the international Labour Organisation in
1995, covering some 344 firms, 'external labour flexibility has been growing, in that many firms (in South
Africa) were resorting to temporary labour or casual labour and were tending more to make use of contract
labour, or subcontracting employment. In over a third of the firms, temporary workers were paid lower wages
than regular workers, and in most cases they were entitled to few or no benefits. Over 82% of firms used
temporary work ers , and o ver 45 % used c o n t r a c t labour'
(www.sairr.org.za/publications/pub/ff/199806/entre.htm).
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(www.cofesa.co.za; www .la bour. gov. za /do cslleg i slationll I rev iew. h tm;
www.workinfo.com/free/Downloads/15.htm)
3.3 Institutions Operating in Durban CMT Sector
The institutional stakeholders currently operating in the clothing industry and impacting on the
functioning of CMTs include SACTWU, BCCI (Natal), the Natal Clothing Manufacturers Association
(NCMA) and COFESA.
3.3.1 NCMA
International experience has shown that employers' organisations can have a pivotal role in the
enskilling of smaller firms. This institution was seen by 37% of CMT operators interviewed by
Harrison and Dunne (1998) as being non-representative. The organisation was in fact founded in 1936
with the intent of curbing the growth of small firms and is currently in danger of closure.
3.3.2 SACTWU
SACTWU was born in 1989 through the joining of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers
Union and The Garments and Allied Workers Union of South Africa
(http ://studentsl.humsci.und.ac.za). SACTWU is affiliated to COSATU and as with other South
African unions its purpose is " ... to assist in the implementation and enforcement of relevant laws
[including] contravention of the Employment Equity Act (1998) and complaints under The BCEA"
(www.ilo.org). Members of the union have the right to enter a business premises, represent employees
at disciplinary hearings and report alleged contraventions of the law to the employer or trade union.
SACTWU also runs a number of social benefit schemes such as a retirement and death benefit
scheme.
Despite the necessity of SACTWU, Harrison and Dunne 's (1998) study showed that most CMTs
viewed SACTWU as an irrelevant institution. Only 36% of CMTs in their study considered
SACTWU to have a constructive function. As many as 20% of members saw SACTWU as a
destructive institution and almost half of CMTs interviewed had no relationship with SACTWU.
3.3.3 BCCI
The BCCI works in close conjunction with SACTWU. As discussed in section 3.2.2 the BCCI co-
ordinates collective agreements under the LRA (especially with regard to agreements on minimum
wages in Bargaining Council areas) and also runs the provident and sick fund. (www.ilo.org)
In a report released by the BCCI (Natal) in June 2001 entitled "the challenges facing the Natal
Bargaining Council as it attempts to regain lost relevance, legitimacy and authority" it is recorded that
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the BCCI has tried to force compliance to bargaining agreements by spending an excess of RI,5
million on lawsuits against non-compliers. The labour court is overloaded and in one documented
case the BCCI waited for over 7 months for a decision on a case against COFESA (due to a
technicality). The BCCI is an irrelevant institution for most CMT operators especially since they
cannot afford the minimum wages agreed to by large full manufacturers. Bargaining council
membership is declining (Figure 11) and small, CMT firms are the principal non-compliers.
3.3.4 COFESA
The official miSSIOn statement of COFESA is ' ... to protect employers' rights, through expert
information, assistance and benefits regarding all labour related issues'. Essentially however
COFESA advises employers on introducing a contract whereby employees are retrenched and become
independent coneacrors" (a process referred to as 'capitalist exploitation' by a SACTWU
representative). Since labourers voluntarily make the shift from employee to independent contractor
there is no grounds to disregard the terms of the COFESA contract.
The COFESA contract exploits the ambiguous traditional definition of an employee, which
distinguishes between an employee and an independent contractor . According to Theron and Godfrey
(2000), ' .. .one of the factors that differentiate an employee from an independent contractor is
subordination . The independent contractor as distinct from an employee is notionally on a footing of
equality with the employer and bound to produce in terms of his contract of work, not by orders of the
employer. An employee, on the other hand, is required to be subordinate to the employer' (Theron
and Godfrey: 2000: 43). This is not the case with COFESA independent contractors. These
contractors do not have the ability to choose their own rate of pay, choose their working hours and/or
work from home but cease to be protected by collective bargaining agreements and minimum
standards legislation upon becoming independent contractors. They are ostensibly employees without
any benefits or protection (Valodia: 2000, Theron and Godfrey: 2000 and Fakude: 2000). COFESA
does offer a benefit scheme for independent contractors however the benefits are unsatisfactory (for
example, only one years pay is offered as compensation for permanent disability) and contractors
rarely contribute to benefit schemes as their wages often only cover living expenses.
COFESA members must pay an annual levy of R1740. This levy covers (1) initial advise that firms
receive on implementing the COFESA independent contractor system, (2) a handbook named the
'Code for Fairness and Productivity' which summarises labour legislation and offers advice on a
variety of labour issues , (3) access to a 24 hour hotline, (4) representation at the Commission for
14 COFESA facilitates this process under the guise of creating 'small business.' An objective which they say is
encouraged in GEAR, the South African government's macro-economic strategy (interview with a COFESA
representative).
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Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA)15, (5) a monthly newsletter and (6) access to the
COFESA website. The annual levy does not cover private consultation with COFESA representatives
nor does it cover representation at labour court. Firms can however contribute to an insurance scheme,
which covers their legal expenses up to RIO 000 per year (www.cofesa.co.za).
Statistics on subscription to COFESA are difficult to find. The COFESA website does however claim
to have ' 120 000 small and large employers' as members employing some 2,4 million people. Fakude
(2000) also records that' ... 80 of the 120 clients of the Durban Manufacturing Advisory Centre
(DUMAC), made up of small and medium sized clothing firms in the Durban area, are involved in the
practice that turns formal employees into so-called ' voluntary contractors ' (Fakude: 2000 : 21).
According to DUMAC statistics 135 small Durban clothing firms belonged to COFESA in 1998
(House and Williams: 2000 : 9). These tend to be CMT firm s manufacturing for the middle to lower
market and utilising a low skilled workforce, (interview with BCCr representative).
For many small CMT firms the independent contractor system is an immediate solution to their
seemingly inevitable downfall. Legal action has in cases been brought against indi vidual firms using
the COFESA independent contract model (see text box 1) but due to inadequacies in labour legislation
(particularly with regard to the definition of an employee) the whole independent contractor system
could not , until recently, be challenged.
Text Box 1: Case history of Building Bargaining Council v Melmons Cabinet cc
The... case, Building Bargaining Council (Southern and Eastern Cape) v Melmons Cabinet cc and another (2001)
22 ILl 120 (LC), concerned a dispute between the bargaining council and Melons, a manufacturer and installer
of cupboards.
Melmons had persuaded the majority of its hourly paid employees to resign and to enter into a standard form of
contract supplied by COFESA in terms of which they purportedly became contractors, who provided services to
Melmons for an indefinite period. The bargaining council alleged that the so-called contractors were employees,
and subject to the bargaining council agreement. The Labour Court in the course of reviewing proceedings, had
to decide on the nature of the relationship between Melmons and the 'contractors'
. . .[using the case study of one contractor, Mr Mawa, the] court noted that while the agreement recorded that
Melmon was a client of the contractor this was nothing less than ' a cruel hoax' perpetuated on Mr Mawa. This
had been done with the assistance of COFESA. While Mr Mawa believed that he was a self-employed
entrepreneur earning more than he did as an employee, he was blissfully ignorant of his newly acquired
obligations and the loss of his rights and privileges as an employee. The court concluded that the agreement that
purported to be an independent contract! principal relationship 'is a sham and it remains a sham even though Mr
Mawa has consented to it' . In truth, Mr Mawa is an employee and Melmons is his employer. The court
15 The 1995 LRA replaced ineffective conciliation boards and the Industrial Court with the CCMA and the
Labour Court (which has the same status as the High Court) (www.labour.gov.za/docs/legislationlllreview.htm) .
The CCMA is the statutory dispute resolution body in South Africa in terms of the LRA. If conciliation is not
achieved by the CCMA they can refer a case to the Labour Court or make Employment Equity Act (1998)
awards in an unfair discrimination case
(www.ilo.org/public/english/employment!gems/eeo/law/south/c_ccma.htm).
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concluded that Melmons was required to comply with the bargaining council's collective agreement and ordered
Melmons to pay the cost of the proceedings.
Source: www.workinfo.com/free/Downloads/15.htm
It is not clear what the impact of amended labour legislation will have on subscription to COFESA but
in the words of a COFESA representative, ' ... the government will put a fence up and we will climb it
a different way' (interview with COFESA representative).
3.4 Competitiveness and Clustering in the Durban CMT Sector
Since both full and CMT manufacturers in South Africa manufacture predominantly for the domestic
market their competitiveness can be gauged by the demand of local customers. In the 1990s there was
a definite shift away from a clearly polarized black and white market towards an amalgamated market
of buyers purchasing middle to lower range garments but demanding more in terms of quality, price
and style variation (Interview with CLOFED representative). It is on the basis of these demands that
one must gauge the competitiveness of CMT firms.
Two studies in the last decade provide some idea of the state of competitiveness of CMT firms
operating in KZN. The first is Harrison and Dunne 's (1998) 'KwaZulu-Natal' s clothing industry: the
importance of firm level and pipeline competitiveness issues' and the second is Salinger et al's (1999)
'Promoting competitiveness of textiles and clothing manufacture in South Africa'. In Harrison and
Dunne's (1998) study, 65 CMTs and 28 full manufacturers were interviewed. In Salinger et al (1999)
14 out of 37 firms interviewed were involved in CMT production. Neither study focuses specifically
on COFESA CMT firms operating in the Durban area but a BCCI (Natal) representative noted that
these firms tended to manufacture for the middle to lower market and employed low skilled workers
(skilled workers tended to be employed in firms higher up the value chain manufacturing high quality
garments).
3.4.1 Process Competitiveness
From the period 1994 to 1996 Harrison and Dunne (1998) discovered that 63% ofCMT manufacturers
had done little to change their organis ation of production in accordance with new market demands .
While CMT operators had decreasing order sizes they tended not to change styles frequently. Change
in order size was therefore not an indication of greater flexibility but rather of declining orders due to
imports . Despite the pressure on CMT firms, they have done little to improve their quality focus or
flexibility. Harrison and Dunne (1998) found that defect rates , bundle sizes and throughput times
increased over their research period.
Firms appear to be doing little to enhance the skill levels of their staff with 88% of CMT firms
reporting that there was no change in their training focus from 1994 to 1996 (Harrison and Dunne:
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1998). Only exporting full manufactures wanting to qualify for DCCs tended to train staff. Small
CMTs operating in the 1990s had high retrenchment levels and often kept workers on short time. In
this context training was a non-viable investment. Staff had very little incentive to increase
productivity, as bonuses were rare and promotion unlikely even after working for a firm for 30 years
(Salinger: 1998).
3.4.2 Supply Chain Competitiveness
The chairman of CLOFED commented that high labour costs were a minor impediment to the
competitiveness of CMT firms. Rather , supply chain management deficiencies undermined sector
wide efficiency. These deficiencies have been perpetu ated by full manufactures, wholesalers and
retailers who, over the last 10 years, have promoted arms length relationships with their suppliers by
decreasing order sizes and encouraging suppliers to diversify their customer base. CMT operators
have not been able to attract new customers and in Harrison and Dunne's (1998) study 26.2% of CMT
firms have not experienced a change in their customer bases even though orders from current
customers are decreasing. Despite waning demand CMT manufacturers are (by their own admission)
failing to meet the demands of their existing clientele and are therefore unlikely to attract new
customers (Figure 12).





- - Customer Demand
--CMT Performance
Quick Response
Source: Harrison and Dunne: 1998: 40
CMT manufactures have little control over their supply base as customers supply most inputs. Where
CMT manufactures do have a direct relationship with suppliers (for example, for package and
trimming inputs), they tended to under perform in terms of quality, price , quick response, delivery,
innovation, reliability and financing options. Only five per cent of CMT firms subcontracted work to
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other firms and in 43% of these cases customers dictated subcontract relationships (Harrison and
Dunne: 1998).
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4 Analysis and Description - Applying the upgrading model to
a sample of ten COFESA affiliated firms
Having surveyed the South African clothing manufacturing sector with specific reference to CMT
manufacturers in Durban, their competitiveness and the government policies and institutions that
effect them we can apply the upgrading model developed in chapter two (presented pictorially in
Figure 7) to a sample of ten firms to ascertain:
I) the upgrading trajectory of CMT firms using the COFESA model,
2) the hindrances to upgrading in these firms,
3) and the upgrading opportunities available to these firms?
4.1 General Review of Firms
In total eleven garment manufacturing firm owners were interviewed all operating their firms in the
greater Durban area (including Clairwood Industria, Phoenix Industria, Durban Central and Umbilo).
Eight of the eleven owners specified themselves as CMT manufacturers (CA to CH), one as a
manufacturers of uniforms for hospitals and hotels (MA), one as a manufacturer of corporate
advertising wear (AA) and the last a pleater of women's skirts (PA). I have assumed PA and AA to be
CMT manufacturers because they are both subcontracted firms. MA, on the other hand, is a full
manufacturer dealing directly with end consumers and is therefore not included in the general analysis
of data that proceeds . This is because the focus of this dissertation is on subcontracted or CMT
manufacturers. MA will however be discussed at a later stage for reasons that will become evident.
The full functions of the sample firms, their market focus and type of clothes they manufacture are
outlined in Table 6.
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Table 6: General characteristics of interviewed sample
Firm Code Age of Firm












PA 19 3 Pleating Ladies' Skirts Upper-Lower
CA 7 3 CMT Ladies' and Girls' Upper
Men's and Boy's
CB 30 4 CMT Shorts and Ladies' Middle-Lower
Outerwear




CD 21 3 CMT Children's Clothing Upper
CE 25 3 CMT Ladies' Wear Upper-Middle
CF 5 5 CMT - Lower
CG 3 3 CMT Girls' Wear Upper
CH 3.5 3.5 CMT Ladies' Blouses Upper
While the age of the firms varied considerably, the majority of firms had only been affiliated with
COFESA for three to five years (the mode being three years). 55% of interviewed firms used the
COFESA contract for all their staff with the remainder being casual workers (Figure 13).









MA AA PA CA CB CC CD CE CF CG CH
[] Total numbe r of worke rs 19 6 45 27 32 35 35 37 40 40 65
.. Number of independent contracto r 19 6 25 27 32 35 35 29 40 16 39
Firm Code
4.2 Competitiveness of Firms
The ideal profile for a competitive firm is one in which both profits and turnover are increasing but in
which profits increase at a faster rate than turnover. Hypothetically, this is because as a firm upgrades
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to the production of higher value added items they will have to produce smaller volumes for greater
profit (Harrison and Dunne: 1998). In the sample of CMT firms, used for this study, quite the
opposite trend is evident. In most firms profits are tending to decrease despite increasing turnover.
This would indicate that firms are accepting more and more orders at lower prices, a trend indicative
of the race to the bottom and the eventual demise of these firms as outlined in Figure 14.








4.3 Horizontal Collaboration Amongst Firms
Interviewed owners did not tend to encourage horizontal collaboration. Owner CF explained that
there was not enough work to warrant any horizontal joint action and whilst owner CD did collaborate
on jobs during busy times, he did not overtly pursue it. He would only do so with people whom he
trusted and who had sound business sense. Owner CA had attempted to collaborate with competitors
in the past but delivery problems thwarted his efforts. Interestingly, owner PA pointed out that the
COFESA model intensified competition and not collaboration. Presumably, this is because the
COFESA system, which aims to improve the price competitiveness of firms, also initiates price wars
between firms.
4.4 Forging of Vertical Ties through Organisational Change
4.4.1 Current Customer Relations
Despite the poor state of competitiveness of most of the interviewed firms, Table 7 shows that eight of
10 firms professed to having excellent, good or velY good relationships with their customers. Only
four felt pressurised by, or dependent on their customers. In these instances pressure was the result of
competition from cheap imports or competition from manufacturers in decentralised areas. Owner CF
noted that CMTs had to fall into line if they were to stay in business. He also remarked that the
pressure he felt as a CMT owner was the result of a 'chain' reaction as merchants (wholesalers) were
also under intense pressure to drop prices. In his opinion, the COFESA model was the only answer to
this negative chain reaction.
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Table 7: CMT-Customer relationships in interviewed firms
Firm Code Number of Customers Principal Customer Type Relationship w ith Customer
AA Numerous Direct to corporate advertisers Very Good
PA Numerous CMT, wholesalers and domestic dressmakers Very Good
CA 3 Retailers and wholesalers Good
CB 6 Wholesalers Very Good except for one
CC 4 Wholesalers Pressurised
CD 1 Design House Very good but pressurized
CE 1 Design House Good but very dependent
CF 1 Wholesalers Pressurised
CG 1 Full Manufacturer Excellent
CH 1 Wholesaler Good
The type of customer that firms supplied appeared to have some bearing on the nature of customer-
CMT relationship. As is evident from Table 7, the majority of sample firms (six of10) manufactured
for wholesalers with whom they had good, very good or pressurised relationships. Only one CMT
did some work for a retail store and whilst two others had once subcontracted for retailers, they found
that cheap imports had undercut their competitiveness in this market. The best CMT-customer
relationship reportedly occurred between firm CG and a full manufacturer. Design houses were also
reported to be good or very good customers (by two firms in the sample) but they pressurised their
suppliers particularly in the areas of price and delivery time.
Despite the generally positive nature of customer-CMT relationships, none of the interviewed firm
owners had any direct or contractual ties with their customers. It seemed that besides one customer,
who engaged in quality control, most customers tried to distance themselves from their CMT
suppliers, contractually and physically. In the case of firm CD, the owner's wife was required to pick
up fabric from the customer and deliver garments back on the required day, meaning that customers
never visited the CMT factory.
The CMTfirms interviewed had little interaction with upstream aspects of the value chain. Textiles
and other inputs (trimmings) were generally supplied by wholesalers. Two firms sourced some of
their non-textile inputs from local suppliers but only owner AA had full experience in dealing with
textile and other input suppliers . She complained that local textiles were not colour consistent leading
her to keep massive inventory stores.
4.4.2 Intra-Firm Efficiency
The supposed principal benefit of the COFESA model is that it enhances productivity. With this in
mind, firm owners were asked to rate the productivity of their staff on a scale of one to five (one being
exceptionally poor and five being excellent). They were also asked to specify if worker productivity
had improved since the implementation of the COFESA system. Five of10 firms rated their staff as
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being good producers. Four said staff productivity was average. Owner CF (whose reign over staff
was almost dictatorial) told me his staff were poor producers because his best workers had moved to
better, higher paying jobs. Five of 10 firm owners estimated that staffproductivity had improved
since the implementation of the COFESA system. Of these five however, three gave other reasons
for the increase in productivity (namely, more skilled staff, greater staff versatility and better working
conditions). Two firms had seen no increase in productivity since the implementation of the system
and three said that it was impossible for worker productivity to improve because there was so little
work. So little in fact that workers sat around playing cards or deliberately slowed down production
so that they could retain their employment until the next order came in.
It is interesting to note that while COFESA's only suggestion for increasing worker productivity is to
pay on a piece work rate, only three firms used this method of remuneration. Of these three only one
firm had experienced an increase in productivity since implementing the piece rate system.
Productivity had remained the same and worsened in the other two firms respectively.
Productivity being a vague measure of upgrading, all firms were asked to rate themselves in terms of
change in production flexibility (including lead times, throughput times and bundle size) and training
focus since the implementation of the COFESA system as highlighted in Figure 15. Most firms had
experienced a marginal improvement in training focus and production flexibility.













I specifically asked owners if they had ever changed their production line layout to enhance
productivity and flexibility. Eight of 10 had never implemented any intra-firm organisational
changes. Of these eight, three said that they changed the items that they produced regularly, but not
the production line. Inflexibility and inefficiency in production was a major concern for owner CG
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who commented that even though prices went down every year his production levels remained the
same' .. .because you cannot push a person to do more than what they can do' . Owner CD employed a
mechanic to visit the factory every day because breakdowns at one stage of the production line caused
'major hold ups'. In the case of the pleating factory (PA) flexibility in production was nearly
impossible because the owner could only afford one steamer. WIP was piled high behind the steamer
and presumably the steamer operator had to work extended hours to compensate for this bottleneck. A
factory layout common in the visited firms is represented in the diagram below (Figure 16).
Figure 16: General layout of factory floor in COFESA firm
Cutt ing Table
Where owners had not changed the layout of their factories, improvements in intra-firm efficiency
were assigned to 'a squeeze from the top', the implementation of the COFESA system, allowing staff
to own work and the multi-skilling of labour. Owner PA regularly stopped pleating on the production
floor for five minutes so that all workers could engage in pattern making. When no pleating work was
available, the factory doubled as a belt factory.
Only two of 10 firms professed to having implemented cellular production techniques. In firm CB
this was undertaken with the help of a consultant sponsored by DUMAC who recommended that the
owner place all similar operators together. The cellular layout was not evident in firm CC despite the
owner's argument to the contrary.
4.5 Size and Nature of Market and Economies of Scale and Scope
Whilst most CMT owners interviewed categorised themselves as manufacturing for the upper and
middle-income groups (as can be seen in Table 6) my personal observation is that all of them
manufactured for middle and lower income groups (confirmed by a BCCI [Natal] representative).
My assumption is that since CMT owners indirectly served some of the larger retailers in South Africa
they presumed that they produced for the upper market segment. While these retailers did once target
upper market segments, they have in recent time realigned to serve the broader middle and lower
income market, which are increasingly saturated by cheap imports.
It is not surprising that nine of the CMT owners interviewed complained that the market size has
shrunk due to excessive importing as well as the expansion of unregulated home industry. Some firm
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owners blamed the government for this phenomenon while one owner scorned retailers for rising
imports and said that retailers were 'killing the industry'. Owner CD despaired that only 30% of
factories had enough work to keep them going all year and at the time of the interview, firm CE only
had enough business to run for two to three days a week. Two firms (CH and CA) noted that the first
six months of the year were the most difficult. In these dire circumstances owner PA was forced to
begin pleating higher volume, lower quality garments for hawkers (as opposed to chain stores) and
hence her ' race to the bottom' was intensified.
In the conditions of a shrinking market, issues such as economies of scale or scope become irrelevant
as firms barely have a enough business to keep their factories running and tend not to have access to
large volume or high quality international buyers (such as Kmart in the US or Marks and Spencer in
the UK).
4.6 Impact of Institutions on Firms
The institutions operating within the clothing industry are doing little to aid upgrading in CMT firms.
The institutions with which the interviewed firms had the most interactions were COFESA, the BCCI
(Natal) and SACTWU. Most firms saw little difference between the BCCI and SACTWU and used
the terms 'Bargaining Council' and 'Union' interchangeably. Only one firm had prior interaction with
DUMAC.
The BCCI (Natal) is seen as a defunct institution, out of touch with the daunting position in which the
CMT industry finds itself. Four of 10 CMT operators reported that their staff had also lost
confidence ill the BCCI and SACTWU because they had failed to receive their provident fund
payouts when they had been retrenched. Having said this, owner CD was sceptical about whether
some firms had actually paid into the provident fund prior to joining COFESA.
Mostly, the interviewed CMT owners had heard about COFESA via the industrial grapevine (a
COFESA representative estimated that the organisation operated on a 98% referral basis). In only two
cases did an agent visit the firm and inform them of the system. The changeover to becoming a
COFESA firm typically began with a presentation offered to the employer and employees of the firm.
This was conducted either with an interpreter or without (in which case, workers never fully
understood the terms by which they were to be employed). In only one case was it reported that staff
were given COFESA literature to take home and discuss with their families. Seven firms had to
retrench their staff before implementing the COFESA system so that staff could receive severance
benefits. Two firms employed only casual workers before the implementation of the system and one
firm commenced business using the system.
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After joining COFESA firms often failed to use the COFESA piece rate system of pay. Seven out of
10 firms continued to pay their staff on a weekly basis and paid little attention to the COFESA
contractual system. A supervisor in CG told me that no workers had signed a COFESA contract even
though the firm was a member of COFESA and owner PA admitted to being totally unaware of the
terms of the COFESA contract. The three firms that did pay according to productivity used varying
forms of the piece rate system. Finn CF for instance gave workers a productivity rating and paid them
per hour accordingly . In firm CD workers kept track of how many garments they manufactured per
week and invoiced the owner at the end of the week. Finn CC was unique in having implemented the
COFESA system as per the specifications of the organisation.
Support for the COFESA system was not unanimous amongst owners. Owner CE spoke of how
COFESA had an 'attitude problem'. This owner had refused to pay his full annual levies and
COFESA threatened to report him to the bargaining council. Owner CB had little interaction with
COFESA and called the Durban office ' incompetent' . She thought that this institution could do much
more to aid the industry. Similarly, owner CH said that he hadn't heard from COFESA in three years
but continued to pay levies in case labour problems emerged. In one instance (relayed by owner CA)
COFESA demanded that a group of CMT firms pay for a lawyer to represent them at arbitration but
the lawyer failed to show up.
Despite requiring members to pay an annual levy, the majority of interviewed firms made little use of
COFESA . While firms CF and CA made regular use of COFESA consultants to deal with labour
relations issues most firms had only used COFESA once to divert the legal onslaughts of the BCCL
The story told by almost all firms was of a threatening visit from the BCCI when they first switch
allegiance to COFESA. When this occurred, most firms contacted COFESA and were not bothered
again". Three firms did not contact COFESA and were also left alone.
For half the firms interviewed the greatest benefit of belonging to COFESA was 'peace of mind'
(namely, assurance that one would not be harassed by unions or the BCCI). Owner CE felt that he had
'breathing space' under the protection of COFESA and owner CG clarified that' ...with COFESA you
don't have any problems, you just pay [your] fees'. Having never been a bargaining council member,
owner CF felt that the flexible pay structure was the greatest benefit of the COFESA system.
Generally owners did not comment on the effect that the COFESA system had had on their
productivity. Only owner CA listed a two per cent reduction in reject rates as one of the benefits of
the COFESA system. A particularly positive (but unsubstantiated) comment regarding COFESA
came from owners CF who stated that, 'COFESA is striving to make things better in this country'.
16 The BCCI (Natal) struggles to bring non-compliers of bargaining agreements to justice because non-
compliance is no longer a criminal act warranting imprisonment (interview withBCCI representative).
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4.7 Impact of Government Policy on Firms
Whilst rising imports were consistently blamed for limiting upgrading in the interviewed firms, only
two firms explicitly connected government trade policy with the rise in imports and the resulting
negative effect on sales. The owner of firm CB was emphatic that if the government did not do
anything about cheap imports, the industry was "doomed" and owner CG called for the reintroduction
of tariffs.
Eight of the 10 CMT operators interviewed reported having no understanding oflabour law. Where
owners did have some knowledge it was gained from the newspaper (this media appears to have
significant influence on the strategic actions of owners). Only CF and PA understood that the
government was "...trying to make labour laws more flexible", however PA commented that labour
law should have been more flexible to begin with. CC postulated that there was no flexibility in
labour laws specifically with laws pertaining to benefits . With regard to benefit schemes, owner CC
commented that CMT operators worked to line the pockets of others (presumably the bargaining
council and unions). Owner CB remarked that labour law makes no concessions for CMTs even
though they provide so much employment. In her opinion, labour laws were targeted at CMTs and
should be reworked to be more lenient towards these manufacturers . If this were not the case, owner
CD speculated that the entire industry would fold. Whilst racist undercurrents are prolific in the
industry, only owner CD specifically stated that he was unhappy with the number of Africans that he
was required to employ under current legislation (he only had two Africans working for him out of a
total of35 workers).
A common complaint amongst the interviewed owners was that government policy overlooked the
industry outside ofthe main urban centres . Firstly, the government failed to register home industries
(home based firms reportedly exist primarily in the residential areas of Chatsworth and Phoenix and
do not pay VAT) and secondly the government did not control the influx of Chinese owned factories
into non-bargaining council areas such as Isithebe and Ladysmith. Wages in unregistered and
decentralised firms were sometimes as low as RIOO per week (interview with BCCI [Natal]
representative), nearly one third of the lowest wage level recorded in an interviewed CMT factory.
Only one firm owner (PA) scorned government for not curbing the rise in crime in industrial areas.
She told a story of how a week prior to the interview she had been held up and robbed outside her
factory. The police took three hours to come and register a case and upon arrival one of the officers
was apparently drunk. Overall, not one positive comment was made regarding the government's
actions in the CMT industry. Owner CB was particularly bitter that the situation of CMT operations
had worsened since the democratic transition because the new government does" ...nothing to support
the industry".
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4.8 Employee Working Conditions, Remuneration and Attitudes within Firms
Pay in COFESA firms was generally in keeping with Bargaining Council standards. On average
machinists in the firms interviewed earned approximately R364, 42 per week with the lowest wage per
week being R246.75 (this is an approximation because this firm used the piece rate wage system) and
the highest being R 441 per week. Owner PA noted that her workers sometimes earned up to R700 a
week if one included overtime pay. In this firm, overtime was paid at time and a half under COFESA
as opposed to double time under the BCCI17• Traditional benefits associated with formal
employment had been dispensed with altogether in the interviewed firms. Five of 10 owners said
that they still contributed to DIF, although subsequent interviews with employees undermined these
assertions. While two firms gave workers the option of contributing towards COFESA benefit
schemes, few did.
Figure 17: Weekly remuneration in sample of COFESA firms
AA PA CA CB CC CD CE CF CG CH BCCI
minimum
o Weekly WaQelWorker R 441 R 3 5D R 320 R 347 o o R 37 5 o R 350 R400 R 34 1
*CC, CD and CF not included as remuneration varies according to piece rate output
Along with poor pay and minimal benefits, workers in the sample of CMT firms had very little job
security. Four of 10 firm owners retained their stafffor long durations but the modal contracting
period was 6 months (the lowest being three months). Owner PA commented that the COFESA
system allowed her to recycle workers in a week if they got 'cocky'. She added that no workers were
indispensable.
Staff representation committees within the firms interviewed were non-existent and therefore few
employees had any real idea of staff attitudes towards the COFESA system. Most employers felt their
staff were happier under the system (because they did not have to pay into benefit schemes) or simply
thought it was fair under current conditions. Despite three firms having experienced staff resentment
(especially from African workers) towards the system, only one firm owner acknowledged that the
17 Overtime is not paid in many CMT firms and employees are simply threatenedwith job loss if they refuse to
work long hours (interview with SACTWU representative).
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system might be detrimental to staff because they no longer received benefits . Generally employers
were ambivalent to perceptions of the COFESA system because they knew that almost all CMT firms
used the system. Staff was so desperate for work that they would accept it under almost any
conditions. Personal observation of factory environments testified to the quiet acceptance of appalling
conditions in some factories. Two factories could be best described as sweatshops. The owner of
factory CF, located in Grey Street Durban, had his factory floor under constant camera surveillance.
Cameras were complimented with 'bouncer like' supervisors positioned around the factory. Staff
worked in desperately cramped conditions in absolute silence and the owner blatantly disliked and
badmouthed his African staff. When I was given permission to speak to a staff member in this factory
she was visibly frightened and would not speak. As in factory CF, the pace of work in factory PA was
manic. While the owner did pay overtime there was clearly no choice as to whether a staff member
worked overtime or not. A worker entered the owner's office during the course of the interview to ask
to attend his 21st birthday party but was refused . Worker safety and health were of little consequence
in this factory and the pleating steamer was regularly opened before all the steam released from the
escape valve. This placed the steam operator in incredible danger and left the factory hot and clammy.
Most employers did not allow me to conduct interviews with members of their staff with owner CH
informing me that it would be pointless to interview a staff member as employees did not know the
terms and conditions by which they were employed. Where interviews were granted they tended to be
stilted, but two interviews proved to be fairly fruitful. An outline of these brief interviews follows.
Geetha, an employee of firm CD was unhappy that she had not been paid out from the provident fund
when the firm left the BCeI but felt that this was probably as a result of joining COFESA. With
COFESA, she felt she had no power or financial security. At the time of the interview she was not
even a member of the UIF (even though her employer said that he did contribute) and she commented
that as a union member she had received many benefits such as access to a union doctor. Now she had
to pay for independent medical care.
Anna who had worked for firm CE for 16 years was similarly unimpressed with the COFESA system.
She had been hurt by the forced transition to COFESA two years previously and complained that she
was now not entitled to any benefits (once again her boss had stated that all staff received UIF). This
would be particularly detrimental if she lost her job. While Anna was unhappy, she was impeded from
finding other work because i) she had no financial protection to support herself if she chose to quit and
find alternative employment, ii) her working hours were too long to search for alternative employment
and iii) all small CMT firms appeared to be COFESA members.
The plight of workers will have serious implications of the future of COFESA affiliated CMT firms
operating in Durban. What does the future hold for these firms, what undermines their
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competitiveness and what options do they have for survival? These questions (the principal research
questions of this dissertation) are considered in Chapter 5.
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5 Answering the Research Questions - The upgrading
trajectories of COFESA affiliated CMT firms and upgrading
opportunities available to them
5.1 Upgrading trajectory of CMT firms using the COFESA system
While COFESA masquerades as an efficiency-improving institutional framework for member firms
they are little more than a protection racket, curbing government interference - at a price. Very few
firm owners implemented , or even knew about, the productivity enhancing piece-wage system that
COFESA promotes. Despite experiencing marginal improvements in productivity, flexibility and
training focus, no firms have implemented efficiency enhancing organisational changes since joining
COFESA and their competitiveness has tended to wane. Increasingly CMT firms are being pushed out
of positive supplier relationships (e.g. with retailers and full manufacturers) and have to meet the
stringent demands of wholesalers at progressively lower prices. The downgrading trajectory of these
CMT firms is clear and most interviewed owners intended closing their operations in the near
future. As examples, owner CE foresaw the closure of his business in six months, whilst owner CH,
who could not always cover his wage bill, did not know if his company would last more than 5 years.
Disillusionment and stress pervaded many of the firms I entered, leading the owner of CC to say that
he had no goals for his firm and owner PA to say that even though she enjoyed running her company,
late hours and constant pressure were too great for her to bear. Owner CA felt that his company was
worth selling but speculated that the clothing industry in South Africa would ultimately die, as the
shoe industry had.
Only four of the CMT owners interviewed saw any future for their firms. Of these four, three
believed that their future lay in numerical expansion. In one exceptional case however, owner CB
commented that increased versatility and better quality were the answer to survival in the highly
competitive CMT industry . Whilst this owner displayed excellent knowledge of issues of
competitiveness, probably because of her interaction with DUMAC, her firm continued to register a
loss and, as with the other CMT firms in this sample, her firm was on a downgrading trajectory with
both profits and turnover decreasing. What can be said to be causing this trend and is it possible to
reverse?
5.2 Hindrances to upgrading in COFESA affiliated CMT firms
The hindrances to firm level upgrading amongst COFESA affiliated CMT firms are strikingly evident.
Firstly, firm owners fear collaboration with competitors and encourage isolationist thinking.
Secondly, despite being cordial , relations with customers tend to be arms-length. Wholesalers in
particular shun contractual interaction with CMT firms and discourage upgrading beyond the functions
of cutting, making and trimming. Thirdly, and with reference to the previous point, the customer base
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of CMT manufacturers locks them into supplying the middle to lower market in which there is
increasing competition. Fourthly, CMT factories are uniformly Fordist in nature. Their layout is
structured to supply mass orders of cheap garments. The factories are too small to supply orders in the
hundreds of thousands (as is the case with some international orders) but too inflexible to supply short
runs of high quality garments. They are in a manufacturing 'no man's land'. Fifthly, the sample of
CMT firms operate in a defective institutional environment. The BCCI has become little more than a
policing organisation since its former roles were undermined18 and the COFESA model reinforces
downgrading patterns in CMT firms. In particular, the COFESA system cuts firms off from
information that might filter through from government institutions19 or the rest of the industry, it
encourages firms to pay undue attention to price competitiveness, it destroys worker security and
quells any affinity workers might have to work towards the upliftment of their firm. The penultimate
hindrance to upgrading in the sample of CMT firms is an unstable policy environment. CMT owners
have almost no knowledge of government policy relevant to the industry beyond that which has
negatively affected them (for example, inflexible labour law and trade liberalisation). They certainly
have no knowledge of any government support programmes or policy relevant to small businesses.
The overriding hindrance to upgrading amongst COFESA affiliated CMT firms is lack of access to
knowledge. Firm owners have no sound knowledge of the market in which they operate or how their
industry operates beyond the confines of their CMT factory. They do not understand government
actions in their sector nor do they have a clear idea of why their firms are in ruin and what they can do
to curb their demise. With this in mind it would appear that, while the COFESA system reinforces
downgrading patterns within CMT firms, firm level upgrading is largely dependent on the owner's
knowledge of the market and market requirements. An interview with firm MA, a manufacturer of
uniforms for hospitals and hotel groups, confirms the point that firm level upgrading has little to do
with COFESA affiliation and everything the do with owner competence.
Unlike other manufacturing firms in this sample, MA is not a CMT manufacturer but deals directly
with 30 to 40 end-user customers at any time with whom the owner said that he had a good
relationship'". MA opened 10 years ago and has been a member of COFESA for three years. Despite
being the smallest factory visited (in terms of staff members and floor area) MA generates the highest
profits and turnover of all interviewed firms (profit and turnover have continued to increase since the
implementation of the COFESA system) .
18 A representative of the BCCI commented that whilst the nature of the South African clothing industry has
changedfundamentally, the BCCIhas not.
19 COFESA has an informative website but many CMT firm owners do not have access to the Internet and all
information on the websitepertainsto labour issues.
20 Ironically, one of MA's customers is the BCCI(Natal), the principal opponent of the COFESA system.
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Owner MA has engaged in significant firm level upgrading since joining COFESA. In particular the
owner reorganised production continually in accordance with market demands21. At the time of the
interview individual workers manufacture entire garments (from cutting to adding trimmings) to cope
with small and varied orders of high quality garments. In essence each worker formed a factory cell of
one person but cell sizes were increased if larger, undifferentiated orders were received. As a result of
the requirements of cell manufacture, the owner engaged in significant training. The owner reported
that his ladies (workers) were 'highly qualified ' and noted that lack of skilled workers was a major
inhibitor of upgrading in his firm. Whilst workers in this factory were not completely happy with the
terms by which they were employed (particularly the fact that they did not receive benefits) they still
earned substantially more than CMT clothing workers (R 500 per week) and their working
environment was both clean and cordial.
Owner MA was satisfied with the assistance that he was afforded by COFESA. He said that worker
productivity had improved substantially since joining COFESA and that he and the workers earned
more as a result of the piece rate compensation system. It appeared that COFESA paid a lot more
attention to firm MA as opposed to the CMT manufacturers interviewed. In particular, a COFESA
consultant had outlined a few systems that the firm could use to improve their productivity. It is not
clear whether CMT firms were presented with anything more than a method to change the status of
their employees to independent contractors. Also, owner MA was the only interviewed firm owner to
present or even mention COFESA's ' Code of Fairness and Productivity ' which a COFESA
representative argued during the course of fieldwork was given to all members.
5.3 Facilitating upgrading in COFESA affiliated CMT firms: Policy
prescriptions
The apt focus of the DTI's ' Integrated Industrial Strategy for Sustainable Employment Growth' (2001)
is to develop the knowledge endowments of firms and to marry these endowments with other
competitive features. While this strategy is a step in the right direction (lack of knowledge being a
major constraint to upgrading in the interviewed CMT firms) , the agencies charged with small
business in South Africa22 and the generic supply-side measures offered by the government to support
the clothing industry do little to aid CMT firms. Supply-side measures comprise almost exclusively of
incentive schemes aimed at large, full manufacturers and are intended to encourage exporting in these
firms. While exporting might be a long term goal for CMT films (especially through collaboration)
the short term crises these firms face include: a shrinking market, lack of functional flexibility
(including multi-skilling and multi-tasking of labour and responding flexibly to a variety of orders), a
21 Along with process upgrading (namely , reorganizing production) the owner was also considering value chain
upgrading (i.e. moving to a completely new, higher value adding activity) by becoming a wholesaler of corporate
gifts.
22 Ntsika enterprise promotion agency, Khula Enterprise Finance , Business Partners , National Empowerment
Fund and Business Referral and information Fund
(www.saafrica.info_business/economy/development/SMALL.htrn).
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disgruntled workforce, isolationist thinking and a knowledge deficit. Government policy could be
specifically aimed at curbing these crises by:
I. Improving the capacity of DTI employees dealing with the clothing sector and SMEs,
11. Diverting incentives to encourage collaboration amongst geographically bound firms (both
horizontally and vertically) 23,
iii. Facilitating clustering amongst firms by developing a database of firms and firm functions and
distributing this information within the value chain,
IV. Strategically promoting value chain upgrading in firms further up the value-chain that serve
both the export and the local market (this would inevitably change the market orientation of
CMT firms further down the chain),
v. Increasing social protection of workers and devising new methods of protecting workers from
risk (particularly the risks of illness, disability or unemployment),
VI. Encouraging the establishment of training , learning and information disseminating institutions
operating in close proximity to clusters of firms (Khula Enterprise Finance and the Business
Referral and Information Network do attempt to fulfil these tasks but have had no impact on
the interviewed firms),
V11. Increasing regulation over institutions already operating in the cluster and empowering these
institutions to promote upgrading in CMT firms
V111. And lastly, promoting skills at the school level that would facilitate upgrading (particularly
business and IT skills).
The effect of existing institutions on firm competitiveness is at best benign. The BCCI (Natal),
although largely discredited amongst CMT firms, is the longest standing and most established
institution operating within the sector. Their most recent task of attempting to enforce bargaining
agreements has proved fruitless and while flexible amendments to labour law might increase
adherence, the Bargaining Council must re-invigorate itself if it is to survive. This institution has the
opportunity to become the government's principal ann in implementing policies proposed above. To
do this it will have to regain firm and worker confidence by innovatively tackling the problem of
worker insecurity and benefiting the industry through training, disseminating information (including
information on market characteristics and industrial restructuring) and/or encouraging collaboration
between smaller firms. New institutions, NGOs or organisations with more credibility in the sector
(for example, DUMAC or COFESA) might however be more effective in bringing about these
changes. COFESA, as it stands, appears to be facilitating its own decline through promoting
23 The chairman of CLOFED proposed that, ' .. .the government should encourage large organizations to
outsource to small guys and should give incentives to the big guys to improveproductivity in smaller firms using
professional assistance.' He went on to speculate that if CMT productivity could be improved, these firms could
manufacture middle of the range garments at the same price as low cost garments. If these price reductions were
passed onto the consumer, the mass clothing market would begin to demand higher quality garments and CMT
firms couldbegin competing in a highervalue addingsegment.
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unsustainable practices amongst its members. The intellectual and financial capacity of this




Based on the research findings presented in Chapter 5, it is possible to create a profile of COFESA
affiliated CMT firms operating in the greater Durban area Having become accustomed to the
protected trade environment of the ' old' South Africa many of these firms were not prepared for the
onslaught of international and local competition in the middle to lower market. In desperation they
joined COFESA, an organisation that did little more than inform them of a loophole in labour
legislation. This loophole allowed firms to retrench staff, re-hire them as independent contractors and
discontinue adherence to bargaining agreements (such as minimum wage rates and benefit schemes).
Without the protection of the BCCI (Natal) workers in the COFESA firms surveyed had almost no job
security or protection from risk (illness or job-loss). Despite the financial reprieve that the COFESA
system offers, the closure of COFESA affiliated CMT firms is imminent. This is because firms failed
to move out of the lethally competitive environment of the middle and lower income market (flooded
with cheap imports) and are now, more than ever, involved in the race to the bottom of their value
chain. There is in fact a tendency in the Durban clothing industry to ' . .. react to changes in the
environment and related crises rather than acting in line with a clear long-term strategy' (House and
Williams: 2000: 9).
It was discovered in Chapter 2 of this dissertation that uni-linear value chain upgrading strategies
(Kaplinsky and Morris: 2001) offer little insight to CMT firms wishing to disengage from the race to
the bottom. CMT firms operating in the developing world are often constrained from moving beyond
the level of garment assembly because local and foreign buyers fear encroachment on their core
competencies (Gibbon: 2000a and Gereffi: 1999a). A number of researchers (Mytelka and Farinelli:
2000; Schmitz: 1999 and McCormick: 1998) have shown that clustering (see section 2.1.4) has helped
small CMT firms overcome well-known upgrading constraints. In terms of clustering literature,
horizontal collaboration between CMT firms and vertical supply-chain integration with customers
(encouraged through the implementation of flexible specialisation techniques) is seen to boost the
competitiveness of firms , but the success of this joint action is dependent on a number of
prerequisites'". The sample of firms interviewed for this dissertation did not meet any of these
prerequisites. They supplied the lower end of the market in which there was increasing competition.
Factories were poorly organised along Fordist lines and had to operate in a weak policy and
institutional environment. There is also a trend amongst Durban manufacturers to shy away from
collaborative solution making (House and Williams: 2000)
24 Theseprerequisites include a largemarket, the capacityto jointly or individually meet large or diversified
marketdemands and a strongpolicy and institutional environment (McCormick: 1998 and Mytelka and Farinelli:
2001) .
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Compounding the problems of the surveyed COFESA, CMT firms was that they had no knowledge of
the upgrading possibilities available to them nor did they display the intent to upgrade. Section 2.1.3.3
of this dissertation clearly shows that upgrading will not occur unless a platform for learning is
devised, 'to acquire product design and development knowledge from outsourcing firms (Humphrey
and Schmitz: 2000: 13). With this in mind the main policy prescriptions of this paper were developed
with the intent to broadening the knowledge base of firm owners particularly in the areas of the market
as well as managerial and IT skills. Other policy prescriptions sought to encourage clustering amongst
firms through incentivising lead firms to vertically integrate with their subcontractors and developing
a database of firms and firm-functions within the value chain.
Considering the focus of this dissertation (CMT firms using precarious employment practices) a
notable lack in the clustering and value chain literature is the link between employment flexibility and
upgrading. Although Bax (1996) and Standing (1999) do propose that employees with precarious
employment contracts tend to have low firm loyalty their hypothesis is not empirically verified.
Further macro studies are required to test this correlation, particularly where employment flexibility is
demand driven (namely, in low skill sectors). Data presented in this dissertation tends to show that the
effect of employment flexibility on upgrading and competitiveness in Durban CMT firms is fairly
benign except in the instance where skilled workers found more secure jobs when they ceased to be
formally employed. In this instance firm productivity was clearly affected by the implementation of
the COFESA independent contractor model but the tight job market means that this situation is
uncommon.
Despite the minimal correlation between upgrading patterns and employment flexibility, ignoring the
plight of 2,4 million COFESA independent contractors (some 35 thousand employed in the Durban
CMT sector) would be unethical. Policy consideration has been given to these workers because their
individual and family survival depends on some level of protection from risk and research conducted
in this dissertation has highlighted the chronically poor conditions in which independent contractors
work. As mentioned, there is also some rhetoric to show that increased worker insecurity could
decrease the propensity or workers to aid productivity enhancing strategies. Locke et al (1995: 153-4
cited in Fryer and Newham: 2000: 9) for instance state that' ... [c]ost-based strategies are likely to lead
to a downward spiral of wages, working conditions and labour standards and to reinforce adversarial
relations at the workplace'.
The large employment capacity of the Durban CMT sector along with its declining competitiveness
necessitates that immediate action be taken to bolster the competitiveness of COFESA affiliated, CMT
firms. While isolated policies could initiate upgrading within these firms, policies aimed at
revitalising the value chain from lead firm to CMT worker are needed to ensure the continued
employment of clothing workers, to resuscitate dying CMT firms and to establish an internationally
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competitive South African clothing manufacturing industry. Ultimately this will require stronger
vertical integration of the clothing value chain in order to effectively manage a competitive foreign
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Appendix 1: Firm level questionnaire






Number of years affiliated to COFESA-
Performance Information:
1. In your own words could you describe the functions performed in you company (Le. design,
marketing, production, distribution, wholesaling, retailing)?
2. For which income group do you manufacture?
3. How many people currently work on your factory floor and out of these how many are
COFESA independent contractors?
4. Do you collaborate with any other CMT firms in fulfilling orders?
5. If so, what is you relationship with collaborators?
6. Do you source any ofyour own inputs?
7. Who are your principal customers and how many customers do you deal with?
8. Please describe the relationship you have with customers?
9. Could you describe the production process in your company from the arrival of raw materials
to the delivery of finished goods? Do you have a manufacturing strategy?
10. Has your company ever implemented any significant production enhancing strategies? If so,
when did you implement these and what changes where made?
11. How would you say the following indicators have changed in your company in the last x years
(x being the number of years affiliated to COFESA)? 1=significant deterioration, 2=marginal
deterioration, 3=remained the same, 4=marginal improvement, 5=significant improvement
• Lead Times
• Throughput Times
• Average Bundle Size Passed between Machinists
• Moves to Multi-Skilling and Multi-Tasking
• Percentage of Wage Budget Spent on Training
12. In your view what would inhibit upgrading in the current global economic context?
13. Would you say that your companies profits and turnover have been increasing, decreasing,
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static or fluctuating in the last x years (x being the number of years affiliated to COFESA)?
COFESA information:
1. How did you hear about COFESA?
2. Could you describe the terms of the COFESA contract?
3. How did you go about making the change to the new contract? What role has COFESA played
in this change? How would you describe the role that COFESA currently lays in your
company?
4. Have any people or organisations complained about you using the COFESA contract?
5. What would you say has been the major factor that contributed to you accepting the COFESA
independent contractor model?
6. Are you aware of any other methods by which you could have improved your employment
flexibility? If so why did you choose the COFESA model?
7. How has the COFESA model benefited your company?
8. What are the negative spin-offs from the specific labour policy adjustments that you have
made?
9. Do contractors in your firm belong to a representative committee? If so, what feedback have
you received from this committee or individuals regarding their employment status?
10. How are contractors paid (weekly wage or piece rate)? Could you give me exact figures? Has
this changes since joining COFESA?
11. Are you contractors eligible for any firm specific or other benefits? If so, what are these
benefits?
12. What is the average duration of stay for a contractor at this company? If it is a short stay, does
it affect your efficiency in terms of training time?
13. How do you feel the change to the COFESA system has affected your staff?
14. How would you rate the productivity of your staff? One being exceptionally poor and five
excellent.
15. Has this changed significantly in the past x years (x being the number of years affiliated to
COFESA)?
16. What is your understanding of South African Labour Law and perception of the changes
through which it is going? Will this affect the manner in which you deal with labour?
17. Do you have a goal for the direction you would like this company to take in the next five years
and if so, what is it?
Worker Questionnaire:
1. Are you an employee or and independent contractor in this company?
2. Were you employed at this company when workers ceased to be employees and became
independent contractors?
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3. What do you feel about the tenus by which you work here? Are you satisfied with these
tenus?
4. What would you say IS the major difference between being employed and being an
independent contractor?
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